Like many auto industry observers, I was initially quite impressed when
My problem is not with the man, but with the mission.
I know Casesa well and have long considered him to be one of the true savants of the global automotive business. When I was a journalist and Casesa was an auto analyst at Merrill Lynch, he was one of the first people I’d call when I was trying to figure out if one of Ford’s moves made sense in the big picture. If I was putting together a team to lead a world-class carmaker, I’d want John Casesa to be part of it.
I’m just not sure I’d want a group vice president of global strategy to be part of it.
Here’s why: Ford managed to save itself without one.
While the rest of the dysfunctional American automobile industry collapsed and was only revived by a massive government bailout, Ford transformed its caustic corporate culture into a model of team-based leadership. Together, that team led one of the most amazing product renaissances in history. It achieved economies of scale in its global operations that became the envy of other automakers. And it reconnected with consumers — not just in the United States, but around the world. As a result, Ford bit off huge chunks of market share from its crosstown rivals like a great white tearing into a seal and posted record profits. And it did it all without a vice president of global strategy.
That was a conscious choice, one that CEO Mark Fields’ predecessor, Alan Mulally, made his second day on the job.
Mulally, who had been the president of
Mulally did not mince words.
“You don’t want somebody on the side doing the strategy,” he said, nodding toward the company’s senior leadership team seated in the front row of the auditorium. “It’s us. That’s the number-one thing. It’s not going to be a strategy department. It’s going to be our team. It’s going to be the leadership team that decides where we are going.”
The independent strategy function was effectively dissolved a few months later — not because strategy was not important to Mulally, but because it was too important to leave to one group. He wanted the entire leadership team to own it.
And it did.
Mulally and the other Ford leaders met every Thursday morning, took the pulse of the company, examined the business environment, discussed new challenges and opportunities and adjusted Ford’s strategy accordingly — not individually, but collectively as a team.
From what I hear, that process is continuing under Mark Fields’ leadership, and I am sure John Casesa will be part of it.
That’s good, because I’m a big believer it not fixing what isn’t broken. Mulally’s successors at Boeing took a different tack with regrettable results.
That is not to say that Ford — or any other successful company — needs to embalm its corporate structure, preserving it under glass for all eternity. Companies, like creatures, need to evolve in order to survive. But those adaptations need to happen for a good reason.
Maybe there’s a very good reason for creating a global strategy function at Ford today.
Ford’s earnings were down sharply last year, falling from $8.6 billion to a still-respectable $6.3 billion. That was partly due to big spending on 24 new product launches, but also the result of increasingly challenging market conditions in places such as South America and Russia. But those challenges are child’s play compared to the life-or-death struggle was engaged in just a few years ago.
I know Fields is aware of what has happened in Seattle and views it as a cautionary tale. He has told me himself that he has no desire to go back to “bad old days” of pre-Mulally Ford, and I believe him.
But I am a little worried that having someone at the table whose job title is global strategy will make everyone else feel a little less responsibility for finding the right way forward.
