The capture by Iraqi forces of the Grand al-Nuri Mosque in Mosul , from where Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared himself ‘caliph’ in July 2014, marks the end of the ‘caliphate’ in Iraq . For three years, the mosque was a symbol of power for the IS, whose black flag flew atop the historic 150-ft tall al-Hadba minaret. IS fighters blew up the minaret when they retreated, practically declaring their defeat in Iraq’s second largest city. They are now confined to some pockets of Mosul, and Iraqi commanders believe it is only a matter of days before they can declare total victory. For the Iraqi troops, the eight-month battle has been particularly torturous, given the high casualties and the strong IS resistance, on the battlefield and through suicide attacks elsewhere. It is quite a turnaround for the Iraqi army, which left its barracks and fled the city without even a nominal fight three years ago when it came under IS attack. The ease with which the IS took Mosul, home to over a million people, had raised alarming questions about the professional capability of the Iraqi army to defend its territory against further possible IS expansion. But Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who ordered the Mosul mission and stayed the course despite the huge challenges involved, has put to rest such concerns, for now.
Mr. Abadi managed to stitch together a difficult alliance to fight the jihadists. While the elite Iraqi counter-terror forces led the ground battle, Iran-trained Shia Popular Mobilization Units as well as the Kurdish Peshmerga militia also joined in. The U.S. provided air cover. Despite conflicting interests — the U.S. and Iran are rivals while both Tehran and Baghdad have uneasy ties with the Kurds — the joint front they forged against the IS could be a replicable model elsewhere, especially in Syria where the IS still controls territories. For Mr. Abadi, however, a bigger challenge is to rebuild Mosul, where hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, and prevent the regrouping of the IS. The destruction of the ‘Caliphate’, the proto-state that Baghdadi established, doesn’t mean that the IS as an insurgency has been defeated. The group is likely to retreat to Iraq’s deserts, much like what al-Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor of the IS, did during 2006-10 after the death of its leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and subsequent military blows. They struck back when they found an opportunity in crisis-stricken Syria and in Iraq’s restive Sunni belt, including Mosul, which was simmering against the sectarian policies of Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia regime. The IS may also bide its time. Mr. Abadi should reassure Mosul’s population that his government will not make the mistakes his predecessor committed. He has retaken the city, and now he has to win over its people.
