Subs and Commandos are great, but they're not icebreakers.
With Sweden and Finland joining NATO, military operations in the polar regions are getting cool again. That interest is paired with weary caution by those who have seen this all happen before. As with any hot new fad, the U.S. military’s fascination with Arctic operations will melt away unless America does something big, bold and different, backing the transient uptick in military interest with tangible civilian resources. But with America’s polar recapitalization efforts in disarray, it is time for Arctic stakeholders to propose a collaborative “Polar AUKUS”, aimed at building icebreakers.
There’s no denying the wide and growing interest in polar operations. With maritime statecraft all the rage, U.S. special operators and allied commandos are making headlines, conducting flamboyant, high-tech set pieces north of the Arctic Circle. A new Department of Defense Arctic strategy is rolling out. Threats from Russia and China loom.
But the snowy fun of, say, linking high-end land forces with U.S. submarines cannot hide the fact that the rest of the U.S. Government is falling behind, hindered by America’s disorganized, wasteful, and dysfunctional efforts at reconstituting fundamental polar capabilities.
In the U.S., military showmanship, coupled with some well-timed Congressional begging, may shake loose some minor funding to modestly enhance Arctic Circle domain awareness and communications. That’s all helpful, but, without regular visits by researchers, civilian agencies, and law enforcement assets, America’s long-standing legacy as a peaceful and responsible steward of both Antarctica and the North Pole is at risk.
America’s approach to both the Arctic and Antarctic is desperate for vigorous, empowered leadership. Lacking a high-profile global push to get America to move forward, the U.S. Government will happily go on convening meetings and churning out endless reams of strategic documents until China starts grabbing whole slices of the Antarctic continent. But all this bureaucratic administrivia is un-needed. Everybody knows the capability shortfalls, and every single strategy completed over the last several decades has identified similar problems.
A new strategy or another round of analysis paralysis won’t get U.S. icebreakers into the field. It won’t speed Polar infrastructure development or get U.S. disaster response assets in place.
But a Polar AUKUS, pushed by the White House and likeminded allies, offers a fascinating opportunity to speed things along. Bringing America, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Canada, Australia, New Zealand—and any other like-minded polar stakeholders—into a focused coalition to build a standard set of icebreakers and ice-rated service craft can leverage specialized expertise and allow cost-effective production of polar-ready ships and icebreakers to scale up.
A Polar AUKUS is maritime diplomacy at work. Only an enormous, high-profile international effort can push America towards a new approach to building government vessels, forcing through waivers and overcoming inefficiencies that make America’s polar-ready ship and icebreaker-building efforts painful and costly exercises in futility.
America’s Big Polar Investments Are Off Track And Need Help
Polar Security Cutter Program is not doing well.
In the U.S. Coast Guard’s modest $13.45 billion budget request, funding for the Polar Security Cutter program has been zeroed out. With some $1.5 billion already allocated to the project, the $47 million cut is a relatively small thing—as the Coast Guard says in the budget materiel, “prior year funding supports program management and construction activities.” But, given that the Polar Security Cutter Program’s cost overrun is expected to be in the billions, the ships need all the cash they can get.
By now, cuts are nothing new for the troubled Polar Security Cutter program. Beset by problems and unloved in Congress, the Coast Guard’s heavy icebreaker has been a poor-performing bill-payer for some years now. In both the 2023 and 2024 budgets, the Coast Guard initially asked Congress for $170 million in Polar Security Cutter funds, but, each year, the Coast Guard received less than $50 million.
That said, industry observers are hard-pressed to recall the last time an active shipbuilding program paused all funding at such an early stage.
The shut-down also represents a big shift in tone by the Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Linda Fagan, who, just two months ago, declared, “getting a Polar Security Cutter fielded is an absolute top priority for the organization.”
No matter how you spin the latest development, the funding cutoff is a grim sign that the Coast Guard lacks confidence in the Polar Security Cutter.
A total funding shut-off is an enormously symbolic—if not an unprecedented—step for a such a major shipbuilding program. It may well presage a more dramatic move if the Administration dares to impose design and procurement discipline over the halting and oft-fragmented recapitalization of America’s Polar-ready assets.
As an interim measure, the Coast Guard is moving forward with purchasing a commercially-available icebreaker, but the only one available appears to be ill-suited for the task and will require expensive refits, non-uniform training and logistical support pipelines. It may well end up being a major management challenge.
A long-standing proposal to build a smaller Great Lakes Icebreaker may get appropriated, but, again, this platform is more a parochial gift to the Great Lakes Congressional delegation than a national-level tool capable of serving both the Great Lakes and, if needed, icebreaking work elsewhere.
Adding insult to injury, other branches of the U.S. Government aren’t doing polar platform recapitalization planning well, too. Over at the National Science Foundation (NSF), the billion-dollar effort to design a U.S. “Antarctic Research Vessel” has fallen off the rails. Meant to replace America’s 30-year-old science icebreaker, the RV Nathaniel B. Palmer, the NSF’s Office Of Polar Programs is, in the name of cost control, cutting critical logistical capabilities while allowing tech-besotted Navy warship designer, Gibbs and Cox, far too free a hand.
In the proposed design, aviation capabilities, critical for Polar logistics, facility inspection and wide-ranging scientific deployments, have been swapped for a raft of high-tech—and likely low-use—sensors, including transducers “mounted in a drop-down centerboard and in an integrated sonar flat to provide improved performance.” The idea of swapping a pricey but relatively resilient aviation capability for an unproven, single point of failure sensor suite—something that will likely only be able to be repaired without access to a big dry dock—is simply laughable.
How To Get Icebreakers, Fast:
All of these U.S. icebreaker programs would be better off cancelled, and the remaining assets—along with the struggling industrial partners—rolled into an effort to support a collaborative, multinational icebreaker building program, rooted in Finland’s now-accessible storehouse of experience in icebreaker fabrication.
The foundation for an innovative NATO solution already exists. In November 2023, Canadian shipbuilder Group Davie—a subsidiary of Inocea Group— bought the assets of Finland’s Helsinki Shipyard, one of the best icebreaker builders in the world. Davie is set to recapitalize Canada’s icebreaking fleet, building—in a U.S. $6.2 billion program—six icebreakers capable of employment in the Arctic, and one heavy polar icebreaker for more complex missions. Add this onto American icebreaker procurement efforts, and there's almost enough demand to make a steady production run of robust and simple icebreakers work out. Add in a few militarized variants and these basic icebreaker designs could both solidify Polar security and help keep Antarctica free for decades.
If enough countries buy into the “Polar AUKUS” consortium, economies of scale can compound even further, driving down costs, building in efficiencies and boosting training schemes. It might even give the Administration and Congress just enough of a strategic justification to overcome “Made in the USA” requirements and really pursue a multinational build program. The shared project will be worthwhile—and, if managed well, it will really help Western democracies deter totalitarian regimes from illegally grabbing the Antarctic continent or snatching away Arctic waters.
