For months, the White House has criticized Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, with President Biden himself calling the offensive “over the top” and the bombing “indiscriminate.” But the President has continued to insure that Israel is supplied with weapons and aid. This mixture of rebuke and support has led to increasing confusion about what exactly his Administration is trying to accomplish. Just last week, the U.S. declined to block a United Nations resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. (In response, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister, postponed a planned visit of an Israeli delegation to Washington.) The resolution expressed “deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip,” and yet, within days, the Biden Administration declared that Israel has not been found to have violated international law in its use of American weapons. On Friday, the Washington Post reported that, despite the government’s public warnings about Israel’s planned invasion of Rafah, where more than a million Palestinian refugees have sought shelter, the U.S. has authorized the transfer of billions of dollars’ worth of more military equipment to Israel.
To talk about the American-Israeli relationship and the Biden Administration’s goals, I recently spoke by phone with Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, and formerly a State Department official who played a role in Middle East peace negotiations, most notably at the end of the Clinton Administration. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what’s behind the Biden policy, the aims of Israel’s war in Gaza, and why American Presidents are so reluctant to cause serious conflict with Israeli leaders.
I have been asked many times recently, by friends and colleagues, what the Administration’s policy is regarding the war in Gaza. I don’t really have an answer. What’s yours?
The policy has evolved, but I think there were two broad objectives. No. 1, containment, to insure that this conflict does not spread and evolve into a regional war. By and large, the Administration’s been relatively successful in containing this conflict. The second involves what to do about the conflict itself. This is not the October War, where within three weeks you had a ceasefire, and American pressure and persuasion resulted in three disengagement agreements that would ultimately lead to Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt, making a trip to Jerusalem.
This was the war in October of 1973 between Israel and Arab states, led by Egypt and Syria.
Exactly. That was a conflict between states that were amenable, particularly in Sadat’s case. He had a strategy. This conflict is between an established state—a close American ally—and an organization that went on a terror rampage on October 7th, willfully and indiscriminately killing, and sexually abusing, and then grabbing at least two hundred and fifty hostages. So the notion that you could somehow be an objective observer and de-escalate and create some sort of modus vivendi between Israel and Hamas—that was not the Administration’s take.
President Biden, both for emotional reasons and for political reasons, and I think for practical policy reasons, fundamentally tethered himself to Israeli war aims, which is to insure that Hamas, as a military organization, is never in a position to pull off another October 7th, or to threaten those communities near Gaza with high-trajectory weapons or cross-border incursions. Biden deeply shares that objective, and Israel’s other objective, which is to end Hamas sovereignty in Gaza.
Right now it seems like the Biden Administration is trying to pressure Israel not to launch a military assault on Rafah and to allow in more humanitarian aid. At the same time, it has shown an unwillingness to take strong steps to punish Israel or to restrict the flow of aid or weapons to Israel if the Israelis disregard that pressure. How do you understand the strategy now?
I’d call the Biden Administration’s approach “passive-aggressive.” They are angry at Netanyahu, and were even before this. He’s presiding over the most extreme government in the history of the state of Israel. That government and the preceding dozen years of Netanyahu’s tenure are undermining the two fundamental drivers of the U.S.-Israeli relationship, which are shared values and common interests. So, it’s passive-aggressive in the sense that, six months into the war, the Administration has still been unwilling—unable—to impose a single cost or consequence that you and I, as normal human beings, would describe as real pressure.
Unable or unwilling?
Both, but I’ll get to that in a second. There were three levers the Administration could’ve pulled. They’re still available. No. 1 is to end U.S. military assistance. There’s no indication the Administration’s anywhere close to that. It just approved a shipment of two-thousand-pound bombs, and twenty F-35s. No. 2, change the U.S. voting posture at the U.N., either by introducing its own Security Council resolution, or by voting for someone else’s, that is very critical of Israel. It has not done that. No. 3, abandon the whole notion of negotiating the hostage release and simply join the chorus of those in the international community who basically say, “You need to pressure Israel to cease this military campaign.”
And I think it has not done these things for three reasons. No. 1, Joe Biden, alone among modern American Presidents, has an emotional relationship with the idea of Israel, the people of Israel, the security of Israel. Then, there is the politics. And, yes, the President is hemorrhaging support among progressives and more than a few mainstream Democrats, but pressing Israel, using this leverage, particularly on military systems, is going to stir up a hornet’s nest among Republicans, conservatives, and the presumptive Republican nominee, who fashions himself as the most pro-Israel President in history. The Republican Party has emerged as the Israel-Can-Do-No-Wrong Party.
And the third I find the most compelling: If Biden is going to change the picture in Gaza before the Democratic National Convention, if he’s going to find a way to de-escalate Israel’s military campaign, surge humanitarian and ultimately reconstruction assistance into Gaza, and free any of the hostages, he cannot do it by renouncing, calling out, or creating any sustained public breach with this Israeli Prime Minister. And everything that he has done and not done has convinced me that that is his objective. The Biden Administration recognizes that this is not Joe Biden against Benjamin Netanyahu. It is not as if Benny Gantz, members of the war cabinet, and most of the political élites are not completely in tune with Netanyahu’s war strategy. If Biden wants to change the picture, he can’t completely renounce the Israeli government. No one in the Administration wants a major breach.
Does Biden want to make a point, Isaac, or does he want to make a difference?
When you say that Biden wants to make a difference, not a point, what do you mean? A difference to what?
To change the situation on the ground in Gaza. That is the President and the Administration’s prime—if you’re a Star Trek fan—directive. That’s what’s hurting the President morally; that’s what’s hurting the President politically. If he renounces Netanyahu and goes to war with him—
But they haven’t accomplished not going to war with him, either.
Exactly, and I’m not here to argue that this is going to work. Israel is not fighting Switzerland, Isaac. Israel is engaged in a major war with a terrorist group that holds around a hundred and thirty hostages, including some Americans.
When you say Israel’s not fighting Switzerland, and Hamas is not Switzerland, I understand the point you’re making. But I don’t really understand why that has to include intentionally starving the Palestinian population.
I don’t think that’s the way the Administration sees it.
Are they reading the news?
No, I’m not saying . . . [trails off] By May, the World Food Programme and others suggest that half the population of Gaza may be on the verge of what they call catastrophic starvation.
Sir, you’re a smart guy. It’s pretty clear what’s going on: Israel does not want to allow humanitarian aid for starving people. I don’t really understand what that has to do with whether Hamas is Switzerland or not.
What is the most effective way? That’s the question. The fact that Hamas isn’t Switzerland is the political point, which limits and constrains the degree to which the Administration can use its leverage on Israel. That’s my point. I’m not denying how bad the situation is for 2.3 million Gazans. What I’m suggesting is, because of the politics in Israel, because most of the Israeli public couldn’t care less about the population in Gaza as long as they hold hostages, you wouldn’t have had an iota of assistance—no crossing points opened in the north, Rafah would not have opened, Kerem Shalom would not have opened—without the Administration pressing the Israelis.
Can we stop here for a second? That’s a really interesting point. You are saying, essentially, that things would actually be worse if the Administration had not—
Much, much, much worse.
I’m a little confused, then. Earlier you said that what binds us to Israel are our shared democratic values, and so on. Why—
That’s under enormous stress.
Well, wait, wait, hold on, hold on. I am curious, then, why this country that we consider an ally and consider part of our shared democratic values would be in favor broadly, as you say, both the population and the government, of intentionally starving people to an even worse degree than what’s happening now.
If you want an explanation as to why I think the Israelis won’t do more to facilitate aid, it has everything to do with internal pressures. The Israeli public is convinced that Hamas is diverting aid, the Israeli media is not presenting to the Israeli public how appalling the situation is in Gaza, and most Israelis would say, “Why should we aid the Palestinians?”
It’s the most extreme right-wing government in the history of the state of Israel. They’re not terribly sensitive, to say the least, to the humanitarian situation. The Port of Ashdod, which is twenty miles north of Gaza, is equipped with the kinds of screening facilities that could allow the Israelis to probably ramp up support to five hundred trucks a day. But they’re not doing that.
You said at the outset that Hamas is not Switzerland, and I thought what you were trying to imply was Hamas uses brutal tactics and doesn’t care about civilian lives and all these things.
Yeah, that’s for sure. I made the point that Hamas is not Switzerland because I think it constrains the degree to which the Administration is prepared to press the Israelis.
Is Israel Switzerland?
I can’t come up with a better explanation than the one that I’ve given you. After six months, the Biden Administration has refused to impose a single cost or consequence on this Israeli government. I talk to some of the Biden people, but I’m not party to their inner council. The Administration must believe, still, that the better play is to try to figure out a way to work, rather than call out, renounce, or create an open breach, with Israel. American Presidents do not like, by and large, to fight with Israeli Prime Ministers. The last American President to use real pressure on Israel—
Eisenhower.
He threatened sanctions if the Israelis did not withdraw from Sinai.
This was in 1956, and on the eve of an election, too.
This is well before the U.S.-Israeli relationship became, quote-unquote, special or institutionally mature. I can’t explain it.
What I’ve been struck by in the last few months is the willingness of the Biden Administration to be humiliated by the Israelis. And I’m not talking about this in a moral or ethical sense. Antony Blinken, the Secretary of State, takes a trip to Tel Aviv and the Israelis embarrass him by announcing land seizures in the West Bank during the visit. Stuff like this has happened multiple times. Or Netanyahu, responding to Biden saying he “has a red line” around Rafah, defies him publicly and even says he has his own “red line.” I’m surprised the Administration doesn’t have a little bit more pride. I keep thinking, even if they don’t want to change the policy, they must be having some sort of human reaction to—
Oh, I’m sure that’s right. When Bill Clinton emerges from his first meeting with Benjamin Netanyahu, in June of 1996, Clinton explodes: “Who’s the fucking superpower here?” James Baker banned Netanyahu from the State Department when he was deputy foreign minister. This is part of what I call the system, the structure of the U.S.-Israeli relationship.
Someone might say, “Why is the most powerful country in human history essentially taking orders from a country that relies on it for aid? What exactly is going on here?”
I’ve been looking at the U.S.-Israeli relationship for decades. I left the government in 2003, during the second Bush Administration. I’d been in government since Jimmy Carter. There was a time when someone could say with a straight face that the three ingredients that made the relationship were a high coincidence of values, a high coincidence of interest, and a strong base of domestic support. During the past fifteen to twenty years, many of which are under Benjamin Netanyahu’s purview as Prime Minister, the value affinity, the perception that Israel shares common values with us, is under more stress.
No President I ever worked for sought a major conflict or confrontation with Israeli Prime Ministers. They sought to manage rather than to confront. The practical reality is that if you want to get anything done, even if it involves tensions and pressure, you have to find a way to work with, rather than against, the Israeli government. My analysis has now been tested six months into the worst Israeli-Palestinian crisis that we’ve ever experienced.
I just worry about a situation where we throw up our hands and say, “Well, the United States, the most powerful country on earth, has no choice but to keep arming a country that’s starving people.”
But, Isaac, look, just between you and me—
It’s an interview, but sure.
The question is: why? I’ve offered you the best explanation based on literally twenty-seven years of watching and participating in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. I can’t explain it. I think your question is a really good one.
You identified Israel’s war aims as the release of the hostages and the removal of Hamas, but you don’t need to be a genius to think Netanyahu needs to keep this war going for his own political survival, that if the war stops, Netanyahu is probably going to lose power. It seems naïve to listen to Netanyahu give a press conference and conclude, “Well, these are Israel’s intentions.” I wonder if we should give so much credibility to why this particular Israeli government says it is fighting the war.
Look, first of all, Netanyahu is not a lone ranger. He’s got a minister of defense, Yoav Gallant, whom he fired and was forced to rehire, who can’t stand him and may be pressing in another direction. Also, in the war cabinet, he’s got Benny Gantz, his putative successor, former minister of defense, and, as an observer to the cabinet, there’s Gadi Eisenkot, a former I.D.F. chief of staff, who lost his son in Gaza. These are not right-wing extremists. And he’s got an Israeli public that, basically, can’t stand him. And, yes, you’re quite correct, when the war winds down, the issue of accountability and responsibility is going to rise up.
I was making a point about intent—
Your point about continuation of the war is correct, but Benny Gantz is behind the Rafah operation. So is Gadi Eisenkot. So I don’t know. The Biden Administration gave Gantz something that it denied Netanyahu, which was a meeting with the Vice-President at the White House, and Gallant was just in town, and obviously had a very good meeting.
Terrific.
They understand that Netanyahu is a huge problem, but there’s not much that they can do about it. When I left the State Department, Colin Powell gave me two pieces of advice. No. 1, “Don’t ever try to come back.” I took that advice. Second, “Don’t ever try to look back.” And I rejected that. I spent the past two decades trying to figure out why we failed when we failed. And the one overriding lesson is that we persisted in seeing the world the way we wanted it to be rather than the way it is. This conversation is an effort to explain, in my judgment, why the situation we face is the way it is. Just so we understand here, I’m analyzing. I have no investment in this analysis or any other.
You’re saying you have no investment in one analysis or another. I could be wrong, but when I was listening to you talk, and you discussed the horrors of October 7th, I sensed an emotion in your voice that I haven’t heard at any other time in this conversation. I don’t want to criticize that, but I do wonder if the people who make policy in America don’t have that same emotion when it comes to Palestinian lives. Do you think that’s fair?
I think it’s fair to say, yes, that America and Americans have a pro-Israeli sensibility. I don’t think there’s any question about that. Clinton wrote in his memoir that he loved Yitzhak Rabin as he loved no man, rarely loved any other man, which is extraordinary. I watched Clinton grieve in the wake of Rabin’s murder. And when Biden gave the speech on October 10th, you watched the tears well up in his eyes. He talked about the black hole of loss. He’s conflated the tragedies in his own personal life with what Israelis felt on that day.
Yes, that’s very moving, but there is another kind of loss going on now which he apparently can’t conflate with his own experience.
Oh, if you’re asking me: Do I think that Joe Biden has the same depth of feeling and empathy for the Palestinians of Gaza as he does for the Israelis? No, he doesn’t, nor does he convey it. I don’t think there’s any doubt about that. ♦
