In December 2023, Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea delivered a speech heralding fundamental changes in inter-Korean relations. He stated that North and South Korea are no longer the same people and announced the abandonment of the longstanding unification policy that had been pursued since his grandfather, Kim Il-sung. It was a declaration that on the Korean Peninsula, there are no longer two governments pursuing unification as one people, but rather two independent countries in a highly antagonistic relationship.
To understand the significance of this declaration and the changes it may bring about in the future, some explanation of the relationship between North and South Korea is necessary. In essence, Kim Jong-un’s Two-State Policy is essentially an official acknowledgement that North Korea has relinquished the possibility of prevailing in competition with South Korea. North Korea’s primary national goal has always been the preservation of the Kim Jong-un regime. To achieve this, North Korea has sought the lifting of economic sanctions and international recognition of its status as a nuclear-armed state. Kim Jong-un’s declaration recognizes that unification is not essential to achieving these objectives.
Kim’s Two-State Policy: Background
On August 15, 1945, with Japan’s surrender, the Second World War came to an end, but simultaneously, the tragedy of the Korean Peninsula began. South Korea and North Korea were separated by a demarcation line arbitrarily drawn by the Soviet Union and the United States. Since then, the two governments on the Korean Peninsula have continuously pursued unification. In 1972, representatives from South and North Korea signed “The July 4 South-North Joint Communiqué”, agreeing for the first time on the basic principles of unification. The three basic principles agreed upon by the two Koreas were independence, peace, and national unity.
Subsequently, many agreements were established between North and South, among which the most important was the 1991 “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchange and Cooperation between the South and the North.” Commonly referred to as “The Basic Agreement,” the preamble of this document defined inter-Korean relations as follows:
“[North and South Korea recognize] that their relations, not being a relationship between states, constitute a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards reunification.”
Since the division in 1945 until the signing of the Basic Agreement in 1991, South Korea and North Korea had not recognized each other as sovereign independent states. The use of the ambiguous term “a special interim relationship” to define the relationship between South and North Korea in the Basic Agreement was agreed upon because it was deemed more convenient to create a favourable environment for unification. However, in September 1991, just three months before the Basic Agreement was signed, South Korea and North Korea simultaneously joined the United Nations. This means that while South and North Korea were recognized as independent sovereign states by the international community and became members of the UN, they at the same time agreed not to recognize each other as independent sovereign states in their relationship with each other.
Certainly, such a situation harboured internal logical instability. However, in practice, the “special interim relationship” had the effect of binding South and North Korea together with the common goal of unification and helped reduce conflict on the Korean Peninsula to manageable levels. Kim Jong-un’s Two-State Policy thus nullifies the 1991 Basic Agreement, potentially leading to the unraveling of the mechanisms for controlling inter-Korean conflicts.
Why now, and for what?
So why did North Korea insist on a change in inter-Korean relations now? Many experts argue that this shift was already foreseen after the failed Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi in 2019. The failure of the Hanoi summit was not only a major blow to Kim Jong-un’s standing in North Korea but also a crucial setback to his plans to improve relations with the United States and gain recognition as a normal state. Kim Jong-un blamed the South Korean government for the failure of the Hanoi talks, leading to a rapid deterioration in inter-Korean relations since 2019.
Furthermore, the intensification of the US-China strategic competition and the improvement in relations between Russia and North Korea are opening up new possibilities for Pyongyang. In other words, North Korea now has the opportunity to achieve the goals it has been seeking through the United States – such as the lifting of economic sanctions, securing its status as a nuclear-armed state, and ensuring the security of the Kim Jong-un regime – through improved relations with China and Russia. For example, on March 30th, in the United Nations Security Council, Russia and China vetoed extending the mandate for the expert panel assisting the sanctions committee on the North Korean regime. This incident shows the direction that Kim’s changed policies are headed for.
South Korean Responses
In his December 2023 speech, Kim Jong-un criticized what South Korea has been advocating for as a “liberal democracy unification,” arguing that it ultimately aims to absorb and merge North Korea. Here, he refers to Article 4 of the South Korean Constitution, which states, “The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.” There has been significant scholarly debate over the meaning and interpretation of this article, which cannot be elaborated upon here in due depth.
In North Korea, the Party Statute of the Workers’ Party of Korea officially supersedes the Constitution, and Kim Jong-un’s orders are superior to the Party Statute. Therefore, in North Korea’s system, changing the constitution with a single word from Kim Jong-un is a completely normal process. However, the South Korean government cannot arbitrarily abandon the goal of unification stipulated in the constitution.
Traditionally, progressive South Korean governments have pursued improved relations with North Korea, while conservative governments have taken a more confrontational approach toward North Korea. The conservative Yoon Suk-yeol government has clearly reaffirmed its commitment to the goal of unification despite North Korea’s Two-State Policy and harshly criticizes North Korea for unilaterally abolishing the common goal of unification. But, even in the case of a progressive government coming into power in the future, there is no possibility whatsoever that it would abandon the mandate of unification stated in the constitution or align with North Korea.
South Korea is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections on April 10th, and it is predicted that the unpopular Yoon Suk-yeol government, due to factors such as inflation and economic downturn, will suffer significant losses in this election. There is concern about whether North Korea’s military threats or provocations will influence the election results. However, contrary to general perceptions, elections in South Korea are not easily influenced by the North Korean factor. Currently, it does not appear that North Korea will pose any threats beyond routine activities like missile launches, and even if more significant provocations occur, their impact on the election results in South Korea is expected to be minimal.
