As four wildfires raged simultaneously across Maui on Aug. 8, firefighters bravely tried to stop their progress with stretched-thin manpower, a lack of vehicles and insufficient water.

They also saved lives, with some entering Lahaina on foot or by moped when downed powerlines and trees made roads impassable or gridlocked with fleeing residents.

The fire department’s emergency response “did not break,” but it was outmatched by limited resources, high winds and extreme fire conditions that ultimately burned 6,271 acres, destroyed 2,173 structures and claimed at least 101 lives, according to an after-action report released Tuesday.

The 84-page report, independently conducted by the Western Fire Chiefs Association, determined that many lessons can be learned from the fire response, not only for Maui, but other Hawaii islands and isolated communities on the mainland.

The goal is to do everything possible to prevent another Lahaina — the most deadly wildfire in the United States in more than a century, with a financial, historical and cultural toll that has been staggering. The fire resulted in an estimated $6 billion in property loss and created a severe housing shortage with 13,000 people displaced.

The report draws on more than 200 interviews and an extensive analysis of available data. It identified 17 challenges and made 111 recommendations to prepare for — and prevent — future disasters. Six of the recommendations already have been implemented.

The report does not address the cause or origin of the fires. Maui Fire Chief Brad Ventura said during a press conference at the Kula Fire Station that he is leaving that assessment to the Hawaii Attorney General, who is expected Wednesday to release the first phase of a comprehensive report. The cause and origin of the fire are being investigated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

The timing of the after-action report’s release also comes ahead of Thursday’s monthly Maui Fire Commission meeting.

Maui’s after-action report details the chaotic day that began at 12:20 a.m. with the first report of a fire in Olinda followed by a second fire in Lahaina at 6:25 a.m. and a third fire in Kula around 11:25 a.m. By the time the Lahaina fire broke for a second time at 3 p.m., this time unable to be put out, many firefighters and personnel already had been battling blazes or handling logistics for more than 12 hours.

“There were firefighters fighting the fires in Lahaina as they well knew their homes were burning down,” Ventura said. 

Throughout Aug. 8, the Maui Fire Department deployed nearly all of its firefighting vehicles from its 10 stations around Maui, and nearly all of its personnel, which includes 282 people in fire operations. Some people worked shifts of 36 hours or more.

But some of the vehicles could have been at the fire scenes faster, the report said.

One of the recommendations is to pre-position equipment during Red Flag Warnings. MFD did not do so despite the National Weather Service issuing the first such alert on Aug. 5.

Another recommendation is to keep its backup fleet equipped and ready to go. Some off-duty firefighters had to wait an hour at a warehouse for equipment to be put on reserve vehicles.

Members of the department have been grappling with what they could have done differently, the report said, “a reflection that will likely persist throughout the rest of their careers.”

The fires were influenced by three main factors: fallow lands covered with invasive grasses that created a volatile fuel source, abnormally dry conditions and the combination of lower relative humidity and extremely high winds associated with a hurricane churning 600 miles south of Maui.

Another area that can be improved is the evacuation coordination between MFD and the Maui Police Department, the report said. Evacuation routes across the island were obstructed by downed powerline poles, trees and wires, exacerbating preexisting challenges with accessing and leaving areas.

MFD asked law enforcement to facilitate evacuations over the radio. The report said the two agencies were not together at incident command posts but should have been.

The Maui Police Department released its after-action report on Feb. 5, which included 32 recommendations for improvement.

The MFD report also suggests identifying key access routes and collaborating with the Hawaiian
Electric Co. to relocate adjacent infrastructure, potentially underground, to make sure downed lines don’t block them.

Recommendations also include better advance coordination for support from the state, other agencies and the military. A lack of mutual aid agreements in place slowed down the ability to get equipment to the island, the report said.

Firefighters from other islands and states flew to Maui but there were no firefighting vehicles immediately available for them to use, Ventura said.

Ventura defended his crews’ actions to leave the first Lahaina fire about five hours after it was reported 100% contained and had burned only about 1.5 acres. During these five hours, firefighters used a lot of water and foam to try to ensure the fire didn’t reignite.

HECO has acknowledged that its downed powerlines caused the earlier fire in Lahaina which MFD had declared contained, but has said the company is not responsible for a second fire that erupted in the same area around 3 p.m. after its lines in West Maui were de-energized.

“The crew stayed on scene for five hours, which was above and beyond what they normally do for most brushfires that we have here on Maui,” Ventura said.

The fire started at 6:35 a.m. at the top of Lahainaluna Road, near power pole No. 25 and the solar farm. With strong winds pushing the fire toward houses in Hale Mahaolu and near the Lahaina Bypass, MFD ordered immediate evacuations of the area.

Just two hours and 17 minutes later — after an aggressive attack with a bulldozer and hose lines, and despite being unable to drop water with aircraft due to the winds — it was reported contained.

Meanwhile, at 11:25 a.m., the Kula fire began in a gulch, east of the bridge on Haleakala Highway, with response delayed by trees falling across the road.

Evacuations were initiated Upcountry. Water also was in short supply, causing engines to stop operations to find water. The fires that were moving downhill at one point switched direction with the swirling winds and destroyed homes uphill.

At the same time, the Olinda fire was increasing in size and complexity, moving downhill. Crews continued to evacuate residents and protect houses while dealing with poor access roads and lack of water. The crews became dependent on water tankers, private water tankers and locals bulldozing fire breaks.

At 2:18 p.m., as the first Lahaina fire operations were being completed, a fire near the Kahului Airport briefly diverted resources to that area but it was quickly put out.

But 45 minutes later, Engine 11 reported flames and a running wildfire pushed by 40 to 50 mph gusty winds heading toward Lahainaluna Road. Additional crews were en route, but within 22 minutes crews saw houses burning in a neighborhood.

That was the start of the firestorm that destroyed much of Lahaina. Four minutes later evacuations were ordered.

The fire was spreading faster than the incident commanders knew due to heavy smoke limiting visibility. Crews thought the fire would stop its northerly direction by the Kahoma Stream, a 100-foot wide concrete flood control swale that runs to the ocean, but it did not. At this point, all but four firefighting vehicles on the island were either in Lahaina or en route, the report said.

By 4:10 p.m. the second Lahaina fire was out of control. Fire hydrants began to lose water supply. The report said it is not known if this occurred because of the large number of burning homes or if the early morning loss of electricity led to the water supply tanks not being filled.

Ventura said the department is working with the water department to identify ways to make it more resilient. He said after discussing the situation with Cal Fire and other companies, it would not have made much difference due to the weather and the conditions.

The mission later went from trying to put out the fire to saving lives. One victim remained with the fire crew inside of a ladder truck while a search was conducted for a lost infant. Other firefighters pulled people out of the water near a seawall or carried them on their backs to safety.

Some had to dodge sheets of roofing blowing off buildings and avoid popping propane tanks.

While the Lahaina, Olinda and Kula fires continued to rage, at 6 p.m. the Pulehu fire began. MFD had only one engine, one smaller vehicle and a rescue vehicle to try to stop it as it headed toward Kihei in South Maui.

By 3 a.m., assisted by a private water tanker and limited aerial water drops, the crews stopped the forward progress of the largest of the four major fires, which burned 3,268 acres alone.

Firefighters continued with rescues, evacuations and firefighting operations through the night until sunrise, when the scope of the devastation became evident.

Other recommendations in the report involved better managing the land that provides fuel for wildfires.

The report said that MFD currently does not have any fire handcrews that can perform fuel mitigation work. In the upcoming fiscal year 2025 budget, Ventura has asked for more personnel for its fire prevention staff, as well as more firefighters for remote areas and more vehicles.

While the Maui County Council has indicated it is receptive to approving the requests, Ventura said it takes about four years for his department to get a new fire truck delivered after it is ordered.

“Maui has the fuel, wind, temperatures and relative humidity, plus the urban interface to create a public policy conundrum,” the report said.

The recommendations also include more public engagement, including adopting a centralized wildfire education program, such as Ready, Set, GO!, and customizing it to be accessible in multiple languages. And to come up with a system to notify tourists about evacuations in multiple languages.

“It is clear that the four major wildfires pushed the MFD to an unprecedented level of strain,” the report said. “Despite this, the collective actions by MFD and law enforcement saved many lives and property across the island.”

Civil Beat’s coverage of Maui County is supported in part by a grant from the Nuestro Futuro Foundation.

Read the full report below.