Which weapon was named after a fruit?

Which two weapons' names come from Czech?

Which weapon was named after a Norse woman's name?

Which two weapons share the same name, though they are about as different as weapons can be? [UPDATE: Some of the commenters were discussing various weapons systems that fit this, and I appreciate their points; but I'd like to limit this question to personal weapons, of the sort that one person would carry.]

None of these, except for one of the two weapons from the last question, is a brand name.

A new California law makes it harder for "Gig" companies to classify certain workers as independent contractors. Uber and Postmates have now challenged the constitutionality of Assembly Bill 5. Attorneys from Gibson Dunn have thrown the entire economic liberty kitchen sink at the law. From the complaint:

AB 5 violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Contracts Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause, Inalienable Rights Clause, Due Process Clause, Baby Ninth Amendment, and Contracts Clause of the California Constitution.

1. Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit to protect their constitutional rights and defend their fundamental liberty to pursue their chosen work as independent service providers and technology companies in the on-demand economy.

2. AB 5 is an irrational and unconstitutional statute designed to target and stifle workers and companies in the on-demand economy.

The first count is premised on the Equal Protection Clause. The parties argue that the law is infected by an "irrational animus."

101. AB 5 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because it draws classifications between network companies and non-network companies without a rational basis for distinguishing between the two groups.

102. Likewise, the statute draws irrational distinctions between independent service providers and non-independent service providers that perform substantially the same work, disfavoring independent service providers relative to similarly situated nonindependent service providers. Laws unconstitutionally singling out a certain class of citizens for disfavored legal status or general hardships are rare. AB 5 is such an exceptional and invalid form of legislation.

103. No sophisticated economic analysis is required to see the pretextual nature of California's proffered explanations for AB 5's differential treatment. There is no rational distinction between network companies and many of the non-network companies granted exemptions under AB 5. The California legislators' focus on subjecting network companies to AB 5, and their willingness to grant a laundry list of non-network company exemptions in order to spare those types of companies the costs and burdens of complying with AB 5, demonstrates irrational animus against network companies in violation of their equal protection rights. This type of singling out, in connection with a rationale so weak that it undercuts the principle of non-contradiction, fails to meet even the relatively easy standard of rational basis review.

Uber and Postmates will have to distinguish this case from Williamson v. Lee Optical. Is the distinction between "network companies" and "non-network companies" who perform the same function any less rational than the distinction between optometrists and ophthalmologists who perform the same function?

But wait–Uber and Postmates argue that strict scrutiny applies! Why? Because the law would "burden, the fundamental rights of network companies and workers to pursue their chosen profession and determine when and how they earn a living." I'm not sure there is a single vote on the Supreme Court for this position. I don't think even Justice Gorsuch would review economic regulations with strict scrutiny.

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Quoted by Prof. Liberman from NPR's Wait Wait … Don't Tell Me!, Dec. 21:

Peter Sagal: Mayor- Mayor Pete has been getting some heat.
I don't know if you saw this.
He attended a big fundraiser in Napa
at a winery with a, quote, "wine cave."
And everybody was so mad that he did this.
But why would you be mad about a wine cave?
It celebrates the two things Democrats are known for, whining and caving.

Very funny, I think, regardless of what party one belongs to (indeed, the "caving" part sounds more like a Democrat-on-Democrat criticism, if it has any real substantive content at all).

Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature from the Institute for Justice.

On January 22, the Supreme Court will consider whether states may exclude religious schools from generally available scholarship programs, or whether such exclusions violate the U.S. Constitution. Espinoza v. Montana Dept of Revenue is an IJ case. Click here for more from The New York Times.

• Pomona, N.Y. (pop. 3,200) residents and leaders with preference for "zero population growth" enact four zoning changes that will impede development of new college where students will train to be rabbinical judges and live with their families, bringing perhaps 4,500 Orthodox/Hasidic Jews into the village. Second Circuit (after 47 pages of facts): Two of the zoning changes were susceptible to an inference of religious animus and violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, notwithstanding that residents would have vigorously opposed any project bringing that many new residents.
• Inmate at Lubbock, Tex. prison alleges he was forced to stay naked for several days in a cell in which every surface was covered with human excrement. He could neither eat nor drink for fear of contamination, and rather than fixing the problem, prison officials merely laughed at him. Fifth Circuit: Qualified immunity. The law clearly established that prisoners couldn't be kept in cells teeming with human waste for months on end, but it hadn't yet covered a stay of only six days. It's clearly established going forward, though.
• Prisoner en route to dental appointment overpowers Cameron County, Tex. officer, seizes handgun, and forces his way into a home. He shoots and kills an occupant, steals a car, and is killed after a high-speed chase. Can two other occupants of the home and the victim's estate sue the gov't? Fifth Circuit: Though at least six other circuits recognize the state-created danger theory of liability, we still don't. But even if we did, these plaintiffs would still be out of luck because they didn't allege the gov't knew that plaintiffs themselves were in danger (as opposed to people generally in the vicinity).
• En route to a mental health facility and high on methamphetamines, man jumps out of his fiancée's car at a traffic light while holding a three-inch knife, wanders to a residential neighborhood. Elizabethtown, Ky. police order him to drop the knife. Instead, he takes a step toward them with his knife raised "in a stabbing position" and tells the officers they'll need to kill him. They do. Excessive force? Sixth Circuit (over a dissent): No.
• The system Michigan officials have set up for prisoners to report rape "is a classic case of Orwellian doublethink," says the Sixth Circuit, and three inmates who allege they were sexually assaulted as juveniles while housed in adult facilities (a policy since abandoned) can proceed with their suit.
• Feds charge defendant with illegal reentry and, during the sentencing phase, make several comments about undocumented immigrants' taking American jobs. Sixth Circuit: The gov't's arguments were "blatantly inappropriate" and "unbecoming of the quality of lawyering expected from the United States Attorney's Office." But because the district court did not rely on those arguments, the defendant's sentence stands.
• During drug conspiracy trial, prosecutor asks witnesses to relay out-of-court statements of unnamed informants. Which violates the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, so the judge orders the prosecutor to stop. And yet the prosecutor does not—ultimately committing over a dozen violations on the first day of trial alone—so the judge grants a mistrial. Defendant: The prosecutor deliberately did it to cause a mistrial; the entire indictment must be dismissed. Sixth Circuit: There's no evidence of that; a new trial does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.
• Farmington Hills, Mich. condo association bans, among other things, dogs, cats, and "immoral" activities. But smoking is allowed, which aggravates an asthmatic resident. Does the policy violate federal housing discrimination law? The Sixth Circuit says no.
• Those arrested for misdemeanor crimes in Giles County, Tenn. are detained after arrest until they pay bail—an amount set without reference to their ability to pay, without a determination of whether they pose a danger to the community or risk of flight, and without their presence. Several arrestees obtain a preliminary injunction against the county and sheriff for this system. Going forward, the injunction will allow bail if accompanied by evidence of the arrestee's ability to pay, necessity of detention, and alternatives to bail. Sixth Circuit: Indeed. And, contrary to the county and sheriff's arguments, the plaintiffs need not have sued the judges for their actions of setting bail. The county and sheriff play an active role in the challenged detention.
• After extensive remediation efforts, the site of a former Army munitions plant near Baraboo, Wisc., once the world's largest propellant manufacturing facility, is now suitable for recreational use. Seventh Circuit: No reason state officials can't allow two recreational uses opposed by plaintiffs: training dogs to hunt (on roughly 2% of the park) and off-road motorcycling (six days a year, among other restrictions).
• Allegation: As five Las Vegas police pin down unresisting concertgoer, a sixth officer chokes him unconscious. Ninth Circuit: Could be excessive force or analogous state law claims: assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. To trial this must go. Judge Fletcher (concurring): And it's high time the Supreme Court clarified when exactly appellate courts have jurisdiction over disputed facts; current practice has resulted in "analytic chaos."
• Huuuge Casino, purveyors of a smartphone casino app, must face a user's suit (claiming that charging users for chips violates Washington state gambling and consumer protections law) in federal court, says the Ninth Circuit (with pictures). Arbitration is not mandatory when companies bury their terms of use "twenty thousand leagues under the sea."
• In 1911, the feds grant a right-of-way to the owner of a reservoir outside Laramie, Wyo. Over the years, people buy the adjacent land and build homes and cabins. Yikes! Flooding damages many of the properties. Double yikes! The reservoir owner then decides to increase the amount of water in the reservoir. Landowners: It flooded because you exceeded the right-of-way. Owner: The right-of-way covers whatever the reservoir occupies, so we can add water as we please. Tenth Circuit: The landowners are right.
• And in en banc news, the Ninth Circuit will reconsider its decision reversing the conviction of a woman who slapped a fellow passenger on a flight to Los Angeles. The original panel had held the trial was improperly held in Los Angeles because the slap occurred somewhere over the Great Plains—and not in the Central District of California's airspace.

I bought it just to try, and I thought it was delicious. It's more a tart than a pie; the cranberries are sweet, sour, and flavorful, and the crust is moist, nutty, and buttery. If you have a TJ's around you, check it out (and at $5.99 for 16.5 oz, it's not a risky experiment).

In New York, a wide range of people can perform marriages, including clergy, elected officials, state judges, and federal judges within the Second Circuit–that is, from New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. The New York legislature passed a bill that would allow all federal court of appeals and federal district court judges to perform weddings. However, Governor Andrew Cuomo vetoed the bill, with this message:

"This bill amends the Domestic Relations Law to expand the number of federal court judges who may perform marriage ceremonies in New York. I cannot in good conscience support legislation that would authorize such actions by federal judges who are appointed by this federal administration. President Trump does not embody who we are as New Yorkers. The cornerstones that built our great State are diversity, tolerance, and inclusion. Based on these reasons, I must veto this bill. Based on these reasons, I must veto this bill. [JB: Yes, the same sentence was repeated twice.] The bill is disapproved."

The approved bill would not have applied only to Trump-appointed judges. It would have allowed all federal judges to officiate at weddings. Yet, Governor Cuomo felt compelled to veto the bill, because the judges appointed by President Trump are not consistent with "diversity tolerance, and inclusion."

I have doubts about whether the current law is even constitutional. Co-blogger Ilya Somin opined on a similar law from Virginia, in which secular wedding officiants must be state residents. That is, state and federal judges from Virginia could officiate at weddings. But ministers of any faith can officiate, regardless of where they reside. Ilya suggested that this law may run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause:

The law might also be vulnerable to challenge under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which forbids state discrimination against out of state sellers of goods or services. Some wedding officiants charge for their services, and there is something of a competitive market in this industry. By banning nonresident secular officiants, Virginia explicitly protects in-state officiants against out of state competition. Although Dormant Commerce Clause law is in a state of flux, such "facial discrimination" against nonresident competitors is clearly prohibited by Supreme Court precedent.

The New York law is even more irrational than the Virginia law. Generally, dormant commerce clause challenges involve laws that limit certain jobs only to in-state residents. The argument goes that the state has some legitimate interest in keeping certain functions local. But under the current regime, federal judges from New York, as well as Connecticut and Vermont can officiate at weddings; they reside in states within the Second Circuit. New York has no control, whatsoever, over Connecticut and Vermont judges. Moreover, federal judges from nearby New Jersey or Pennsylvania, for example, are prohibited. I doubt anyone would challenge this law. It is easy enough to find an officiant in state.

Two related anecdotes.

First, Justice Kennedy refused to officiate at weddings. Why? He offered these remarks in 2013, shortly after Windsor was decided:

However, speaking earlier this month at the University of California Washington Center, Justice Kennedy said the affianced—whether gay or straight –would have to find someone else to do the honors.

"I have a rule: I don't do weddings," Justice Kennedy said. The reason has to do more with another doctrine he has championed: federalism.

"I have a theory that federal judges can't take authority from state laws," including those that regulate family relations, he said.

Still, on this matter, the Supreme Court's swing vote emphasized his own judicial modesty. "I can't figure out whether it's a valid theory or not," he said.

Second, Justice Scalia planned to officiate at Bryan Garner's wedding in Rhode Island. But state law generally prohibited out-of-state judges from officiating. As a result, Garner had to arrange for the enactment of a bill in the state legislature to allow Scalia to preside. Garner discusses this story in Chapter 10 of Nino and Me : 

We pressed our Rhode Island contact, who told us that we must have a special bill enacted by the Rhode Island Legislature authorizing Justice Scalia to conduct the ceremony. Only one day was left in which this could be accomplished, but our contact assured us that they would get it done. In the end, we learned that there was actually debate on the floor of the legislature about the matter. A Republican (!) legislator had stood up and said, "We don't need an out-of-state judge coming in to Rhode Island to perform a wedding! We have plenty of able judges in this State." Fortunately, his opposition was summarily squelched. Meanwhile, just as the bill was being voted on, I received an e-mail from Justice Scalia: "No reply regarding my authorization under Rhode Island law. Should I start worrying? Nino." We were all relieved when we got news that the legislative resolution had passed—only five days before the ceremony.