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July 1987
The Republicans in '88
Conversations with
the candidates and an analysis of their candidacies.
by William Schneider
The Republican party is the party of the Revolution, and to Republican
activists, 1980 is Year One. I found this outlook pervasive when I
interviewed groups of delegates to the 1984 Republican National Convention
for the Los Angeles Times. What did the delegates think of the
Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy, which, polls showed, was still widely
admired? Republican activists were unimpressed. "Who cares about those
guys?" said one exasperated delegate. "That's all over with. It's
prehistoric."
History ended late last year. The Reagan revolution ran out of initiative
exactly six years after it began. Its enemies did not bring it down. It
simply collapsed. In part, the Administration was a victim of its own
success. The President had done what he was elected to do--curb inflation
and restore the nation's sense of military security. What reason was there
to continue the revolution? At the same time, Iranscam exposed the
excesses of a revolutionary mentality. Reagan, a man of deep ideological
convictions, attracted true believers to his Administration. He also
prided himself on a management style that, in the words of the Tower
commission, "places an especially heavy responsibility on his key
advisers." The combination of ideological fervor and disengaged management
turned out to be explosive. It meant that zealots were tolerated and even
encouraged in the White House, and that no one kept an eye on what they
were doing. "None of this would have happened if Ronald Reagan were still
alive" was the sardonic comment heard in Republican circles. That is
precisely wrong. It happened because Ronald Reagan was very much alive.
Nineteen eighty-seven is Year One of the post-Reagan era. The problem is,
Ronald Reagan is still in office. The revolutionary regime has outlived
the revolution. Reagan himself is a lame duck, his effectiveness depleted
and his popularity squandered.
Having been abruptly thrust into the post-revolutionary era, Republicans
are scratching their heads and asking each other, "Now what?" These days,
virtually all Republicans are conservatives who endorse the principles of
the Reagan revolution, even if they dissociate themselves from its errors
and excesses. What they have to figure out is how to change the regime
while preserving the revolutionary tradition. It is very much like the
problem Communist parties face when they have been in power too long. The
problem is more serious for Republicans, however; unlike Communists,
Republicans can be turned out of office.
All Republican Party leaders are Reaganites, just as all Communist Party
leaders are Leninists. But that doesn't prevent partisans of either
persuasion from going off in different directions. Some Republicans are
Old Bolsheviks, who fought at the glorious leader's side during the great
revolution. They see themselves now as guardians of the revolution, as
keepers of the flame. But the glorious leader is no longer the hero he
once was. His errors are being exposed. Although his close comrades will
probably escape the unhappy fate of the Old Bolsheviks under Stalin, their
support has been eroding quickly and their political future looks
problematic.
Other Republicans are revisionists. They proclaim their loyalty to the
Reagan revolution but say that their mission is to correct its mistakes.
The more the mistakes that come to light, the more attractive revisionism
looks. But revisionists have to be careful. If they go too far, they will
raise questions about their commitment to the revolution. The line between
revision and counterrevolution is a thin one.
Finally, the Reagan revolution, like all revolutions, has a Red Guard.
These are the ideologues who talk about a bold new agenda aimed at
extending the revolution. They preach an aggressive, not a defensive,
conservatism, one that will bring new groups into the movement. They even
dream about exporting the revolution to other countries.
During the next year, the Republican Party must decide which kind of
conservatism
-orthodox, revisionist, or radical--will be the party's agenda for the
future. The winner will end up in New Orleans, the losers in the political
equivalent of Siberia.
BEFORE THE REVOLUTION
The conservative consensus in the Republican Party was achieved only
recently, and with considerable difficulty. Throughout most of this
century the Republicans were as factionalized as the Democrats. But
whereas the Democrats have traditionally been divided North against South,
the major split in the Republican Party has occurred along an East-West
line.
In the early part of this century the wing of the Republican party in the
Midwest and the West was a hotbed of progressivism, a doctrine that
combined radical political and economic reform with isolationism. The
eastern wing of the party tended to be economically conservative,
internationalist, and big-business-oriented. The New Deal essentially
eliminated the economic left of the Republican Party, by stealing the
progressives' economic thunder. Progressive Republican (and third-party)
voters rallied behind FDR and were, for the most part, absorbed by the
Democrats. After the progressives left, the remaining western and
midwestern Republicans were mostly conservative and
small-business-oriented, but were still staunchly isolationist.
Three Republican factions emerged after the Second World War: the parties
of Wall Street, Main Street, and, eventually, Easy Street.
Wall Street was the eastern wing of the party. It was the Republican Party
of Thomas Dewey, Dwight Eisenhower, and Nelson Rockefeller. In a usage
that must have been hopelessly confusing to Marxists, the Wall Street
Republicans were usually considered to be the left wing of the party,
since big business quickly learned to accommodate to and even prosper
under the big-government economic policies of the New Deal.
Main Street was the midwestern wing of the Republican Party, its
geographic and ideological center. Main Street Republicans were rural and
small-town dwellers, bankers and small-business men--decent, honest,
God-fearing, and tightfisted. The Republican Party of Main Street was the
party of Robert Taft and Everett Dirksen, of Arthur Vandenberg and Gerald
Ford.
These two wings of the party found themselves in a confrontation shortly
after the Second World War. Main Street Republicans were "real
Republicans," who longed to turn the clock back to pre-New Deal America
and who displayed more than a tinge of isolationism. Wall Street
Republicans were "me-too Republicans" and staunch internationalists,
motivated by economic self-interest and businesslike pragmatism. The
showdown came in 1952, when Eisenhower, the candidate of Wall Street,
defeated Senator Taft, of Ohio, for the Republican nomination.
The remainder of the 1950s saw a gradual reconciliation between eastern
and midwestern Republicans. Many leading midwestern figures, like Senator
Vandenberg, of Michigan, had already converted to internationalism, as a
result of the Second World War. The Cold War converted the rest of the
isolationists, who had objected to America's alliance with the left but
now supported a foreign policy of militant anti-communism.
Easy Street, the Republican Party of the nouveau riche, is an altogether
new phenomenon. It appeared quite suddenly in the suburbs and boomtowns of
the Sun Belt, a part of the country that had never been a center of
Republican strength. Easy Street Republicanism first became visible with
the presidential candidacy of Barry Goldwater, in 1964, when Goldwater
challenged and defeated the eastern establishment of the party, as
represented by Rockefeller and William Scranton.
The Easy Street wing of the party espouses a vigorous, populist,
anti-establishment conservatism that appeals to many working-class voters
and Democrats, particularly on social issues and foreign policy. In 1964
the Goldwater movement attacked the bipartisan foreign-policy consensus
that accepted peaceful coexistence with communism. In 1976 Ronald Reagan
ran against his own party's policy of detente. The backlash against civil
rights also contributed to Goldwater's southern support in 1964 and to the
Republican Party's subsequent rapid growth in the South. The 1968 Wallace
vote, for example, which was almost entirely an expression of racial
backlash, was essentially folded into the 1972 Nixon vote; Nixon's worst
state in 1968, Mississippi, became his best state in 1972. Outside the
South, racial and social
issue backlash brought a good many white ethnics into the Republican
Party. What had once been an exclusive club for the WASP elite now found
itself overrun with Irish and Italian Catholics, the so-called Archie
Bunker vote. The most dramatic example is the Republican Party of New
York. A party once led by Nelson Rockefeller, Jacob Javits, Kenneth
Keating, and John Lindsay now counts as its top officeholder Alfonse
D'Amato, who was resoundingly re-elected in 1986 in a straight two-party
race.
Look at the career of Richard Nixon, the dominant figure in postwar
Republican politics. Although he started his career as a Communist-hunter,
by 1960 Nixon was Eisenhower's boy, the candidate of the Wall Street wing
of the party. When he ran for President again in 1968, Nixon tried to
repair the Goldwater calamity by presenting himself as a centrist--a Main
Street Republican and party regular who avoided divisive ideological
positions and promised to "bring us together." It helped that his
principal opponents for the Republican nomination were Reagan on the right
and Rockefeller on the left. Nixon chose an eastern liberal as his running
mate--Spiro Agnew, of Maryland, a Rockefeller supporter whose nomination
was seconded by John Lindsay.
By 1972 Nixon had become the candidate of the Sun Belt, of San Clemente
and Key Biscayne. He was tough in Vietnam and an uncompromising foe of
liberals and radicals. Thus, in three presidential campaigns Richard Nixon
traveled clear across the Republican Party spectrum, from left to center
to right, and on into oblivion.
The final reconciliation between Main Street and Wall Street Republicans
came in 1974, when President Gerald Ford appointed Nelson Rockefeller his
Vice President. Reagan, when he challenged Ford for the 1976 nomination,
tried to undo this alliance by designating Senator Richard Schweiker, of
Pennsylvania, as his prospective running mate. Reagan gambled that eastern
Republicans, who controlled the margin of victory at the convention, would
not see much difference between a Main Street conservative like Ford and
an Easy Street conservative like himself. He was wrong, although his move
did shake up the convention and keep his candidacy alive for a while.
Ford's eventual choice of Senator Robert Dole, of Kansas, as his running
mate did little to placate the Reagan forces, who saw Dole as just another
Main Street Republican.
The triumph of the Easy Street Republicans came with Reagan's victory in
1980. George Bush's decision that year to minimize his ideological
differences with Reagan signaled the capitulation of moderate Republicans.
Essentially, the Easy Street Republicans won control of the party and made
their revolution. The Wall Street and Main Street Republicans have
remained in the party, but only on Reagan's terms.
As the former senator Paul Laxalt said this year, "The old rift in the
party, between a Goldwater and a Rockefeller, just doesn't exist anymore.
Everyone will be running as a Reaganaut." Indeed, all the candidates for
the 1988 Republican nomination are Easy Street conservatives.
Representative Jack Kemp, the Reverend Marion G. (Pat) Robertson, and
Laxalt all have roots in that wing of the party. The two candidates who
originated in the Wall Street wing, George Bush and Pierre ("Pete") du
Pont, the former governor of Delaware, have both shed their moderate skins
and become converts to the Reagan faith. Bob Dole, the Senate minority
leader, came from the Main Street wing of the party but made a point of
assiduously courting the Republican right during his two years as majority
leader. Dole has a solidly conservative voting record and has established
his credentials as someone who can deliver for the right. Thus, when
conservatives claim that they have no candidate to rally behind in the
1988 primaries, as they have been doing lately, they are not quite telling
the truth. The truth is, they have all the candidates.
KEEPERS OF THE FLAME
Vice President George Bush has one advantage and one disadvantage as a
candidate for President in 1988. Both of them are Ronald Reagan. Since the
outbreak of the Iran controversy, it has become clear that Bush's fortunes
are tied to those of the Administration.
Bush's life-or-death dependency on Reagan can be seen in the polls. In a
survey taken in late January by CBS News and The New York Times, three out
of five Americans disapproved of President Reagan's handling of foreign
affairs. Among Republicans who supported Dole for the 1988 nomination,
four out of five disapproved. Bush supporters, however, were one of the
few groups in the survey to approve the President's foreign policy. Polls
of Iowa Republicans taken early this year showed Dole running ahead of
Bush for the nomination. But polls of New Hampshire Republicans taken at
the same time indicated that Bush was still ahead of Dole in that state.
The explanation? Ronald Reagan. Reagan's approval ratings have been
running low in Iowa as a result of that state's devastated farm economy.
New Hampshire, however, is part of the New England boom economy. Reagan's
popularity has been holding up well in New Hampshire. Consequently, Bush's
has too.
In other words, Bush remains a viable candidate for the Republican
nomination as long as the Reagan Administration retains its base. "Your
base," a politician once said, "is the people who are with you when you're
wrong." Reagan was wrong on Iran. The Tower commission has said so, and
the President has admitted as much. Although hard-core Republicans and
conservatives were shocked at the spectacle of their President selling
arms to the Ayatollah Khomeini (very few rallied to the call by the former
White House communications director Patrick J. Buchanan to "start firing
from the upper floors"), they did not desert Ronald Reagan. For that
matter, during Watergate most Republicans stuck with Richard Nixon until
the White House tapes were published. Only when they read evidence of
Nixon's appalling lack of decorum did they start falling away. So far the
Reagan Administration has not been discredited with its base. A base
values loyalty to its leader, and that is exactly what Bush stands for.
"I've never considered loyalty a character flaw," the Vice President said
while he was campaigning in lowa.
In other words, George Bush lives, and that has got to be regarded by
Democrats as good news. They see Bush as the weakest possible candidate on
the Republican ticket--and for good reason. Loyalty to an Administration
discredited with all but its hard-core supporters is no great source of
strength. The problem is not unique to Bush, however. In any
Administration the quality that makes for a successful Vice President is
loyalty. That same quality makes for a poor presidential candidate,
however. Voters do not value "loyalty" in a President; they value
independence and leadership, the image of a candidate as "his own man."
That is the vice-presidential trap. The stronger and more popular the
President, the more he diminishes his Vice President by comparison. But a
Vice President cannot desert a weak and unpopular President for fear of
incurring the charge of disloyalty. As it was put to me by Walter Mondale,
who should know, there is about the office a "dependency smell." The smell
doesn't seem to bother partisans, and so a party unable to renominate its
incumbent typically nominates its most recent Vice President--Nixon in
1960, Humphrey in 1968, Mondale in 1984. But dependency apparently does
matter to the larger electorate; none of these candidates won the ensuing
general election.
Everyone in American politics, including George Bush, is aware of this
problem. Bush knows that he is under pressure to differ from Reagan's
policies, to reveal a message or vision of his own. But he also knows that
the minute he distances himself from the Reagan Administration, he risks
giving up his strongest advantage. So far he has played it safe and been
impeccably loyal. He has done no more than hint at his own priorities. At
"Ask George Bush" forums in Iowa last March the Vice President suggested
that the federal government could play a greater role in educating people
about the dangers of AIDS, expressed the view that, "regrettably," the
condition of education in the United States was not what it should be, and
called for a greater emphasis on fostering democracy and economic
development in the Western Hemisphere. None of these could be labeled a
significant departure.
For Bush, Iran has been a classic no-win situation. After the scandal
broke, reporters spent months trying to demonstrate that the Vice
President was deeply involved. The principal disclosure was that Bush had
been informed by an Israeli official that the United States was dealing
with radicals, not moderates, in Iran. The Vice President had then, he
explained, expressed "certain reservations on certain aspects" of the
policy. The Tower commission could find no evidence of this, however.
After the commission's report was released, Bush remarked that he took "no
pleasure in the fact that I got very little ink." In response to chuckles
from the audience he added, "Oh, maybe I do. "
Soon, however, people began asking a different question: Why wasn't the
Vice President more involved in the policy? He was supposed to be the
crisis manager on the National Security Council, the chief foreign-policy
professional in the White House. He should have known that the arms deal
was a bad idea and would never work. "The Vice President is noteworthy
more for his absence than his involvement in this whole unfolding
tragedy," Edmund S. Muskie, a member of the Tower commission, said. When
President Reagan was asked at his March 19 news conference whether Bush
had objected to the arms sale, he answered, "No." The next day the White
House had to explain that Bush did "express reservations" to the President
about the deal but that the Vice President "always supported the policy
and the decisions." "There did appear for a fleeting moment to be a
misunderstanding," Bush said afterward. Poor George Bush. Whether he was
involved or uninvolved in Iranscam, he ended up, as he told his Iowa
supporters, "catching the dickens" over it.
One of Bush's strengths as a candidate is his resume. He built a
successful oil business. He served two terms as a congressman from Texas.
He lost two Senate elections (good for humility). He was the chief United
States delegate to the United Nations. He was the chairman of the
Republican National Committee (during Watergate, no less). He was the U.S.
envoy to China. He was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He
ran for President. And he was elected and re-elected Vice President of the
United States. One can almost hear the echo of Walter Mondale in 1983: "I
am ready to be President."
But Bush's career is nothing if not an establishment career. And this is
still very much an era of anti-establishment politics. That is one reason
why movement conservatives, who see themselves as an anti-establishment
force, continue to distrust him. No matter how loyal Bush has been to the
Reagan revolution, he still looks and acts like the kind of Republican the
New Right set out to destroy twenty
three years ago. Last year Richard A. Viguerie, the former publisher of
Conservative Digest wrote a letter to the editor of The Wall Street
Journal detailing Bush's sins. He had a moderate voting record in
Congress. He did not give ideological direction to the Republican Party.
He received an award from the Ripon Society, "a club of John Anderson-type
Republicans." In his 1980 campaign he called Reagan's economic proposals
"voodoo economics," a term that has stuck to Bush more than it has stuck
to Reagan. His inner circle includes not a single "movement conservative.
"
And--the unpardonable sin--Bush was well born. Viguerie quoted Bill
Baxley, the lieutenant governor of Alabama, who, in 1984, called Bush "a
pin-stripin' polo
playin' umbrella-totin' Ivy Leaguer, born with a silver spoon so far back
in his mouth that you couldn't get it out with a crowbar." Whether the
charge is fair or unfair is not the point. The point is that the
Republican Party has not dared to nominate a candidate born to wealth and
privilege since Charles Evans Hughes. Democrats can get away with it
(Roosevelt, Kennedy). Republicans can't.
Reportedly, the day after the 1984 New Hampshire primary, Bush approached
Senator Gary Hart on the Senate floor. After congratulating Hart on his
dramatic primary victory Bush asked him what plans he had made for the
Maine caucuses the following week. "This is all happening very fast," Hart
replied. "We're just playing it by ear." Bush then informed Hart that his
summer place in Kennebunkport was currently vacant, and if Hart needed a
place in Maine to relax and unwind, "just say the word--it's yours." There
are two ways of reading this episode. One is that George Bush is a nice
guy, which is undoubtedly true. The other is that he has an establishment
mentality, a preppie outlook that sees politics as a game (with Hart
playing in a different league). The good sportsman, not the true believer.
Bush's style of conservatism was captured by the cartoonist Herblock last
year, when in a caption he referred to Bush as waving a pennant that read,
"Go Contras!"
Bush is a reasonable and serious man who looks at an issue from all sides,
even if, in the end, he always supports the Administration's position.
When I met the Vice President in his White House office last year, the
subject of trade came up. "There are no virgins in the field of trade
protection," Bush told me. "But to the degree an Administration can keep
the pressure on for one road or another, we should keep the pressure on
for no protection, or for less protection, or for not going further down
the protection road." He called the Strategic Defense Initiative "a moral
answer to the question of nuclear arms," while admitting that "the
doctrine of mutually assured destruction has worked." But, he added, "that
doesn't mean we can't think of a new and better way to do it with less
risk to mankind." About Central America he said, "The worst thing we could
do is impose U.S. power. That would revive and solidify all the countries
against us, including the democratic countries. I don't think we have to
learn that lesson from Vietnam. We have to learn that lesson from our own
history and our own hemisphere." He said he welcomed the religious right's
involvement in politics. "They should be active. But I don't plan to roll
over and say, 'Hey, take over the Republican Party.' For somebody like
me--no."
Sensible, informed, pragmatic--not the kind of thinking one usually
associates with movement conservatives. Or with President Reagan, for that
matter. Bush's strategy so far has been to split the Republican right and
keep any potential rival from building a base among conservatives. Toward
that end he has praised the Reverend Jerry Falwell for "the moral vision
you have brought to our political life." And he spoke at a tribute to the
late William Loeb, the right-wing publisher of the Manchester, New
Hampshire, Union Leader, who reviled George Bush during the 1980 campaign.
Bush's strategy has worked. The conservatives have so far shown no
inclination to coalesce on a single alternative. On the other hand, his
courting of the right occasioned a savage attack by the influential
columnist George Will, who depicted Bush as a phony and a panderer. "The
unpleasant sound Bush is emitting as he traipses from one conservative
gathering to another," Will wrote, "is a thin, tinny 'arf'--the sound of a
lapdog."
And then there are the jokes. The Doonesbury cartoon depicting Bush
committing his manhood to a "blind trust." The Washington Post's
characterization of Bush as "the Cliff Barnes of American politics:
blustering, opportunistic, craven, and hopelessly ineffective, all at
once." The crack that he's the sort of man who reminds every woman of her
first husband. The "wimp" factor. Democrats salivate at the prospect of
running against Bush. They remember his shrill and frantic demeanor in the
1984 vice-presidential debate with Geraldine Ferraro. And his pseudo-macho
posturing the next day, when he commented that he'd "kicked a little ass"
in the debate. All this matters because it says something important about
Bush. He bleeds. As David Keene, formerly Bush's national political
director and now a Bob Dole operative, puts it, "He sends out a message of
personal instability....Bush is not seen as a stable commodity."
Still, for several reasons Bush remains the front-runner for the 1988
nomination. He has been around the track before. He is likely to do well
in the crucial early caucuses and primaries--in Michigan (where last year
he scored a decisive victory over Kemp and held off Robertson in the
selection of precinct delegates), in Iowa (where he beat Reagan in 1980),
and in Texas, his home state. And he can raise the big money needed to
compete in the fourteen-state "Mega-Tuesday" primaries, which are now
scheduled to take place three weeks after the New Hampshire primary.
The continuing Iranscam revelations pose the biggest threat to Bush's
candidacy, particularly as the investigations focus on the diversion of
funds to the Contras. Bush could be discredited indirectly if it is
discovered that President Reagan knew about the diversion of funds.
Evidence that Reagan lied to the American people would demoralize the
President's supporters and devalue the appeal of Bush's loyalty. Bush
would also be discredited if he were found to have been aware of or
personally involved in the illegal transfer of funds. His
national-security adviser is already known to have played a key role in
resupply operations for the contras. Any disclosures along these lines
from Oliver North or John Poindexter and George Bush's presidential
candidacy will, in his own immortal words, end up in "deep doo-doo."
One politician who seems keenly aware of Bush's liabilities is Paul
Laxalt. "A Vice President, in order to be a good Vice President, loses his
credibility," Laxalt told me when I visited him at his Senate office. "He
appears to be a Charlie McCarthy. He has no views of his own. That's the
essential reason, I think, historically Vice Presidents haven't made it
[to the presidency]. It's a loser job." The view that George Bush is
unelectable appears to have motivated Laxalt to get into the race. "George
is obviously the front-runner," he added, "but it's wide open."
Laxalt has the informal status of "First Friend." He was elected governor
of Nevada the same year Reagan became governor of neighboring California.
He is one of the original Reaganites, having served as the chairman of
Reagan's 1976 presidential campaign. He has acted as Reagan's personal
emissary in the Senate, his envoy abroad, and the general chairman of the
Republican Party during the Reagan presidency. Laxalt is known to be a
personal favorite of Nancy Reagan's, whereas Bush is believed not to be.
In short, Laxalt is the person best qualified to challenge Bush's
credentials as keeper of the flame. Laxalt is clearly worried that if Bush
is nominated, the flame will go out. "My strongest reason [for running],"
he said last year, "would be that the Reagan program and policies be
perpetuated beyond Ronald Reagan." Laxalt's candidacy creates serious
problems for Bush. Laxalt has a prior claim on the loyalty-
and money--of the old Reaganites. Any partiality the President might show
toward Bush will vanish if Laxalt becomes a full-fledged candidate.
Laxalt is not only close to Reagan--he even resembles Reagan in style and
temperament. Laxalt is viewed as sharing Reagan's best character
traits--notably a sense of personal security and of decency. In explaining
why Reagan has been successful as President, Laxalt told me that "people
like and trust him--those are very important elements in this business." I
asked, "Would you describe yourself as sharing those characteristics?"
"Oh, yes," he replied. "We're exactly on the same wavelength when it comes
to that."
At another point in the interview I asked Laxalt what he regarded as his
principal achievements in twenty-four years in public life. His answer in
this case was notably different in tone. "Oh, boy. I'd have to think about
that," he said after a pause. "I'm not comfortable with self-serving
situations." Laxalt, unlike Reagan, has no record as a leader. His
colleagues say that he never delivered a memorable speech in twelve years
as a senator. He did not run for majority leader. The only time he played
a leadership role on a major issue was in the fight against ratification
of the Panama Canal treaties--a fight that he lost. In fact, there is no
evidence that he is any better prepared than Bush to offer "a new
beginning, a new horizon" in the 1988 campaign. "I don't have any grand
vision yet," he has been quoted as saying. "Wish I did."
Laxalt's conservatism is like his temperament--relaxed. There is little of
the fervor one finds among movement conservatives, or in Ronald Reagan.
About defense spending, he told me, "I'm increasingly concerned about the
cost of defense. I just wonder how much water there is in that $300
million. I've sort of come to the conclusion that Eisenhower was probably
right: watch out for the military-industrial complex." Imagine Ronald
Reagan saying that.
His attitude toward the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was equally placid,
if a bit confused. "I'd like to see the Sandinistas be replaced,
peacefully," Laxalt said. "That's as far as we're concerned. I have no
problem with the Contras doing their thing."
Want to hear a relaxed ideology? I asked Senator Laxalt for his view of
progressive taxation. "Depends on the times," he said. "What about right
now?" I asked. "Right now I don't really believe in it."
One achievement Laxalt can take credit for is serving as Reagan's personal
envoy to Ferdinand Marcos, in the Philippines. I asked him whether the
Administration had learned anything from its experiences in the
Philippines and Haiti. "As far as those events being object lessons that
have changed Administration policy, I don't know," the Senator said. "I
think those events just plain happened."
Well, no. When the Reagan administration came to power, in 1981, the
President endorsed the foreign-policy views that Jeane Kirkpatrick, then
an obscure political-science professor, had expressed in a 1979 magazine article.
Using the examples of President Carter's allegedly failed policies in Iran
and Nicaragua, Professor Kirkpatrick argued against "the pervasive and
mistaken assumption that one can easily locate and impose democratic
alternatives to incumbent autocracies." But she observed, too, that "the
history of this century provides no grounds for expecting that radical
totalitarian regimes will transform themselves." In the case of
authoritarian regimes friendly to the United States, our policy should be
to encourage liberalization and democracy, Kirkpatrick argued, not
threaten revolution. In the case of radical Marxist regimes, encouragement
will do no good; they will respond only to threats.
The Democratic line has been precisely the reverse: threaten the right,
encourage the left. The party's 1984 platform, for instance, threatened
maximum pressure against the apartheid regime in South Africa, on which
the Democrats wished to impose economic sanctions and an arms embargo.
While recognizing "the undoubted Communist influence" on left-wing
insurrections in Latin America, the platform stressed "the indigenous
causes of unrest" in these countries and called for "social, economic and
political reforms" that would accommodate the "legitimate forces of
change." The Democrats' proposed policy toward Cuba and Nicaragua was not
to threaten them militarily but to encourage change and reward it by
improving relations.
The Democratic view is that sanctions against right-wing dictatorships,
which are often dependent on U.S. support, can bring about effective
change, whereas the United States has much less leverage against Communist
regimes. Kirkpatrick argued that it is dishonest and usually
counterproductive to threaten our friends while offering to stabilize
relations with totalitarian countries of the left.
Then, all of a sudden, came the revolutions in Haiti and the Philippines.
The Reagan Administration discovered, more or less by accident, that
sometimes it was in our best interest to take a tough line with right-wing
dictators like Jean-Claude Duvalier and Ferdinand Marcos and even to help
depose them. Moreover, such actions were applauded not only by liberals
but by a broad spectrum of the American public, because they were
accomplished with a minimum of effort or involvement.
The Reagan Administration took advantage of the situation. On March 14,
1986, the President sent a message to Congress proclaiming the
Administration's commitment to "democratic revolution" around the world
and pledging to use American influence to encourage democratic change. The
document included this Carteresque assertion: "The American people believe
in human rights and oppose tyranny in whatever form, whether of the left
or of the right." Haiti and the Philippines were indeed object lessons
that changed American foreign policy. Yet Senator Laxalt, who was
intimately involved in the American response to those events, somehow
failed to grasp their significance.
Laxalt's moral attitudes are as relaxed as his thinking. He is a divorced
Catholic. As governor of Nevada, he supported legalized gambling and
legalized local-option prostitution. "Taking money from gamblers [in
Nevada politics] is like taking auto money in Michigan," he has said. He
has described Nevada as a "live-and-let-live state," and he says that he
straddles the line between fundamentalists and libertarians--"That's where
I am." He is not relaxed when it comes to his reputation for personal
integrity, however. In 1984 he filed a libel suit against the owners of
the Sacramento Bee as a result of an article charging that money was
illegally skimmed from gambling proceeds at his family's casino. The trial
date has been set for June 23, but because of a pretrial ruling allowing
the reporter to keep his sources confidential the case may prove difficult
to resolve.
Laxalt retired from the Senate last year, but he promised the Reagans that
he would stay in Washington for the remainder of the current
Administration. He suffered a political setback in November when Jim
Santini, a Democrat-turned-Republican whom Laxalt had favored as his
successor, lost the Nevada Senate race. As for his presidential plans, he
formed an exploratory committee in April and announced that he was "about
as close as you can get" to declaring his candidacy. Reagan's loss of
popularity as a result of Iranscam removes the strongest justification for
Laxalt's candidacy. If the public is dissatisfied with Reagan's
performance, why should it vote for a Reagan replicant? Laxalt's case
seems especially weak now that the Tower commission has criticized the
President's "disengaged" management style and his inattention to detail.
Those arguments, plus his "Nevada problem," plus his lack of a strong
leadership record or a rallying cry for his campaign, may keep Laxalt, who
says he won't run unless he can raise $2 million by October, out of the
race. In which case, as a retired senator and a friend of the President's,
he could just relax.
PRINCES OF THE SENATE
The surge in anti-Democratic voting in 1980 gave the Republican Party a
net gain of twelve Senate seats and a majority in that chamber for the
first time since 1954. The majority lasted six years. For the first four
years the majority leader was Howard Baker, Jr., of Tennessee. Baker, who
had been a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1980,
gave up his Senate seat in 1984 for the explicit purpose of considering
another try for the presidency. "My perhaps excessively cute remark during
the 1980 campaign," Baker told me last year when I called on him at his
Washington law office, "was that we are going to see if you have to be
unemployed to run for President.
Bob Dole, who succeeded Baker as the Senate majority leader, was the
party's vice-presidential candidate in 1976 and, like Baker, made an abortive run for
the presidency in 1980. Dole assumed the majority leadership for the same
reason Baker gave it up--to help position himself for another presidential
campaign. "Well, one of us is wrong," Dole quipped. Dole gained
considerable visibility and stature after taking over as the majority
leader. Baker seemed to disappear for two years, although he never gave up
his presidential ambitions. Last February, when President Reagan summoned
him to take over as White House chief of staff, Baker was meeting with his
family in Florida to discuss his plans for 1988. "I had pretty much made
up my mind to run," Baker said after accepting the White House
position.
Ironically, by taking himself out of the 1988 race, Baker may have
enhanced his prospects for eventually becoming President. No one had
counted Baker as a serious contender for the 1988 nomination. He was too
moderate, too establishment, no longer a "player" in national politics. A
loss in 1988 would most likely have ended Baker's career in national
politics.
Now Baker is definitely a player. But what game is he playing? Many
conservatives expressed horror at his appointment, which seemed to
symbolize the takeover of the Reagan Administration by the Washington
power elite. But it also symbolizes the eagerness of the Republican
establishment to come to terms with Reaganism. As much as Reagan is using
Baker to rescue his presidency, Baker is using Reagan to restore his
standing in the Republican Party. "He is our President," Baker said after
assuming his new job, "and our dedication is to see that it looks good
after eight years." Or, as they say in advertisements for beauty products,
"We don't look good if you don't look good."
Baker regards himself as a Reaganite. But he expresses a distinctly
revisionist view of President Reagan, referring to him repeatedly during
our interview as an "establishment President." He said, "I think there has
indeed been a Reagan revolution. But I don't think it is an
anti-establishment revolution. That might be the rhetoric, but that is not
the reality of it." He praised Reagan not for his ideological leadership
but for his skill at coalition management: "To be able to hold diverse
groups together for a common purpose even though they have disparate
objectives--Reagan does that better than anybody I ever saw except
Roosevelt."
What Howard Baker brings to the White House is professionalism. What the
White House gives Baker is a record of commitment to the cause. There is
even talk of Baker's becoming a compromise presidential candidate in 1988
if the party remains stalemated after the early primaries. "To the extent
Howard is seen as having rescued the Reagan presidency and restored a
sense of credibility to the White House, it could happen," Senator William
Cohen told Newsweek in March. "It's a long shot, but not inconceivable."
In fact, it is probably less of a long shot than were his prospects for
winning the nomination before he became chief of staff. In accepting the
job, Baker most likely made a realistic assessment of his chances for the
1988 nomination, as well as the Republican Party's chances of retaining
the White House next year. He may have decided that 1992 (when he will be
sixty-six years old) looked like a much better year and that a tour of
duty in the Reagan Administration would give him much stronger credentials
than a humiliating defeat at the polls.
Bob Dole, like Howard Baker, is a prince of the Senate. He became
nationally known first as his party's vice-presidential nominee, in 1976,
and later as a result of serving as the Senate majority leader. The
majority leadership has done Dole a lot more good than his nomination for
Vice President did. Dole seemed to diminish in stature during the 1976
campaign, when he came across as a nasty and narrow
minded partisan (during the vice-presidential debate with Walter Mondale
he referred to the two world wars, Korea, and Vietnam as "Democrat wars").
Four years later Dole ran seventh in the New Hampshire primary, garnering
597 out of 150,000 votes. The Republicans' loss of the Senate majority
last year might have been a blow to Dole's stature, but within a few weeks
of that defeat Dole became his party's hottest property. What did it for
him was his deft handling of the Iran issue.
Hardly a day passed last November and December when Dole's name was not at
the top of the news. He pressured the Administration for full and
immediate disclosure of all details relating to the Iran arms deal. He
called for a special session of Congress to create select investigating
committees. He endorsed proposals for a special review board to review
National Security Council operations, a special prosecutor to investigate
possible criminal activities, and a special legal adviser within the White
House. He even proposed an allied summit meeting to "lay all the cards on
the table." In short, Dole called for a radical program of damage control
without criticizing the President directly. Reagan "didn't make any
mistakes," Dole said. "The people who worked for him made mistakes."
What prompted Dole to act quickly and forcefully was the voice of
experience. He had been the Republican national chairman and an ardent
defender of Richard Nixon during the Watergate scandal. It nearly cost him
his Senate seat in 1974, when he won re-election by fewer than 15,000
votes. As he explained last December, "I had a strong belief it wasn't
going to blow over. I'd already been there."
There was some predictable grumbling from Dole's rivals that he was
distancing himself from the President. Jack Kemp's press secretary said
that Dole was "too far out in front, too eager to make news over the
corpse of a popular President." But the charge of disloyalty didn't stick.
Instead, most Republicans seemed to agree with the assessment made by John
Deardourff, a leading party strategist, who told The New York Times,
"[Dole has] stepped right up to bat, admitted there was a serious problem,
and proposed ways to solve it. That appeals to people with an
institutional interest in the party--the people who will play a big role
in the nominating process--because it is a sign of a mature, sophisticated politician." The evidence
could be seen in the polls. The bonanza of publicity boosted Dole's
standing and made him the principal challenger to George Bush (thereby
confounding Bush's expectation that most of his problems would come from
the party's right wing). In fact, as the Iranscam story continued to
unfold early this year, many pundits gave up on Bush and began to regard
Dole as the new Republican front-runner.
All Dole can be divided into three parts. The first phase of his national
career was the period 1976-1980, when, as a result of the 1976 campaign,
he was known primarily as a hatchet man for the Republican Party. The
second phase came during Reagan's first term, 1981-1984, when, as the
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, he emerged as one of the leading
critics of the Reagan Administration's reckless fiscal policies. Then, as
majority leader in 1985-1986, he became a Reagan loyalist and the chief
legislative strategist for the conservative agenda. Dole's "opening to the
right" improved his standing among movement conservatives and gave him
considerably more credibility as a presidential contender.
All three Bob Doles are still very much in evidence--the sarcastic
partisan, the spokesman for the establishment, and the right-wing
strategist. Elements of each could be seen in his aggressive response to
Iranscam. Dole has not really changed over the past ten years. He has
simply added new layers of complexity.
Dole has never been able to resist taking a jab at supply-siders. "I could
never read anywhere that they wanted to reduce spending," Dole told me not
long ago. "All I could see was they wanted to cut taxes." What
supply-siders don't understand, he said, is that "it has to be a double
track. You have got to say, 'Let's stimulate the economy, let's reduce
taxes, but let's also reduce some of this federal spending out there.'
That is where I criticize those who run around and talk about supply-side
economics."
Dole also takes a critical view of social-issue conservatives. He thinks
that there should be room in the party for religious fundamentalists, but
says, "If those issues are listed first, then I think you are headed for
trouble. You are going to divide the party in two." As for the prospective
presidential candidacy of the television evangelist Pat Robertson, Dole
said, "So far he is helping me out. I reminded Dole that Phyllis Schlafly
once said that he didn't have his heart in the issues conservatives care
about. "I don't have a heart in her issues," he replied. Did he regard her
criticism as fair, then? "No. But coming from her, it is probably a
plus."
Dole has long been mistrusted by movement conservatives. In November of
1985 Fred Mann wrote, in the National Review, "Reaganite loyalists,
supply-siders, and New Right activists have all had occasion to regard the
powerful Dole as a serious danger to their causes: His instinct for the
safe center often seemed to assert itself most strongly on the questions
they regarded as most critical." As the leader of the
fiscal-responsibility wing of the Republican Party, Dole played an
important role in getting a tax increase passed in 1982. That effort
earned him the label "tax collector for the welfare state" from
congressional conservatives. Today he says, "A lot of people have
forgotten what was in that bill. That was the first step toward tax
reform. We went in and closed a lot of loopholes. We didn't raise anyone's
taxes except those who had big fat tax breaks."
Dole has been a strong advocate of civil-rights and voting-rights
legislation. He has fought against cuts in Medicare and Medicaid. He has
supported food stamps and other anti-hunger programs. Dole, whose right
arm was shattered during the Second World War, is also deeply committed to
aid for the handicapped, including his own Dole Foundation for Employment
of Persons with Disabilities. (Business interests eager to curry Dole's
favor have been generous contributors.) Having stressed the need for
budget cuts, Dole added, "There is a role for government. There are
vulnerable groups in this society for whom we have obligations as a
government." He said that we must do what we can to restrain waste, "but
if we are going to err on one side, maybe it ought to be spending a little
too much rather than not enough."
I asked him about the Reagan Administration's commitment to supporting anti
communist revolutions, including the overthrow of the Sandinista
government of Nicaragua. Did he support that foreign policy? "I wouldn't
say yes or no. Generally...no, I don't think so." About trade Dole said,
"I have never felt much for those titles like free trade and
protectionism."
Two years ago Dole told the New York Times, "I'm perceived as a moderate
Republican for all the work I've done on tax reform, voting rights, food
stamps, all the stuff for veterans and the handicapped. But we're going to
make a play for the conservatives. I think I deserve a shot at them."
Indeed, Dole's voting record has been staunchly conservative; he has
supported President Reagan on about 90 percent of major legislative votes,
including abortion, school prayer, and a balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution. He employed the political consultant
David Keene, a longtime movement-conservative activist, and made Donald J.
Devine, an influential neo-conservative, the director of his Campaign
America political-action committee. Last year Dole became a tougher and
far more partisan figure in managing the Senate agenda, sidetracking
Democratic amendments and giving high priority to issues dear to the
hearts of the New Right. In his final year as majority leader, Dole led
the fight to confirm the right-wing favorite Daniel A. Manion as a federal
judge.
Dole sided with the Reagan Administration and against most of his Senate
Republican colleagues in opposing tax increases. He allowed anti-abortion
amendments on the legislative agenda. He supported military aid for Jonas
Savimbi, the leader of the anti-communist forces in Angola. Despite his
expressed reservations, he voted to aid the Contras in Nicaragua. He
favored applying federal anti-extortion laws to labor violence. He called
for the abandonment of the unratified SALT II treaty with the Soviets. He
is the favorite of the conservative activist Paul Weyrich, who gives Dole
high marks--in contrast to his predecessor as majority leader. A
conservative group issued a statement calling Dole "the finest Republican
Senate leader since Bob Taft."
Dole has clearly gone a long way toward making amends with the Republican
right. But as for his being one of them, the evidence is not convincing. A
self-described "realistic conservative," he continues to focus on the
deficit. "The first priority on anybody's agenda," he told me, "is going
to be how to control the federal debt. We are going to reach the
three-trillion-dollar ceiling by 1990. That demands a little summit
meeting up on the mountain top with the leaders of both parties plus
business and labor. In fact, I am already working on the invitation
list."
Dole remains resentful about the absence of fiscal responsibility in the
White House. "Some of us have made the hard choices," Dole said. "We voted
on May 10, 1985, to freeze Social Security and terminate fourteen
programs. We walked the plank, and then the White House pulled the plug."
He complained that "every time I mention the word taxes, I get a memo from
someone saying, 'Oh, don't say that. You're just getting over the 1982
flap [about the tax-increase bill].' We can't walk around with blinders on
in this country. You read that Jim Miller [the budget director] announces,
'Well, it looks like we are going to have a bigger deficit than we
thought.' Well, that is just great. What happened to all those assumptions
they were making, the 'rosy scenarios'?" Dole expressed wry amusement at
the fact that, apparently because of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill,
"there is a perception out there, not at all accurate, that we've somehow
dealt with the deficit."
Dole's message seems to match the defensive mood that now prevails in the
Republican Party. The party has had its revolution. Before heading off on
some bold new adventure, it might be a good idea to go back and correct
the mistakes that were made. One was Iranscam. On that issue Dole was
quick to establish his standing as a professional who would never tolerate
such excesses. The other mistake was the deficit. Although Dole no longer
talks about raising taxes, he clearly identifies with the bite-the-bullet
school of Republicanism. He said that the "most exciting vote" he ever
cast in the Senate was that 1985 vote to freeze cost-of-living adjustments
for Social Security recipients. "In the U.S. Senate that morning," he told
The Washington Post, "we demonstrated to the American people there was a
majority willing to take on everyone in America for the sake of America,
to put on the brakes and tell the American people that someone was willing
to vote no....The deficit is not going to grow away or go away. We are
going to have to address it head-on, without taxes, and we are going to
have to do it the hard way."
Supply-siders contemptuously refer to that sort of message as "austerity
talk." Republicans ran on such messages for almost fifty years--cut the
budget, there is no such thing as a free lunch, you can't spend yourself
into prosperity, the day of reckoning is at hand. It was not a spectacular
vote-getter. The Democrats tried to steal the Republicans' thunder in
1984, when Walter Mondale ran against Reagan on the deficit issue. The
Democrats got caught in the same thunderstorm. Moreover, Republican
strategists know what happens whenever their leaders talk about cutting or
freezing or modernizing or "taking another look at" Social Security. They
unleash a hurricane, and the whole party has to run for cover.
In making the deficit a principal issue in his campaign, Dole is very much
a prince of the Senate. Congress, which is usually blamed for the deficit,
is the one branch of government that takes the deficit seriously. Of
course, President Reagan says that reducing the deficit is important--but
he makes it clear that other things, like keeping taxes down and defense
spending up, are more important. The public is essentially in agreement
with the President's view. Sure, we should reduce the deficit, people tell
the pollsters. But not if we have to raise taxes or cut entitlement
programs or reduce social spending or cut defense. Do it some other way.
Pass a law making the deficit illegal, for instance, like a
balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution or the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
deficit-control bill. The deficit, everyone agrees, is bad. But other
things, like reducing the deficit, are worse.
The one constituency that responds to the deficit issue is the Republican
establishment, and there Dole has hit pay dirt. A poll taken in March by
ABC News and The Washington Post found that "Bush ...does well among
lower-income and younger Republicans, but his numbers drop sharply among
older, wealthier and better-educated respondents," where he ran behind
Dole. This should be deeply disturbing to Bush partisans. It means that
Dole is eating into Bush's base--the party establishment. And it means
that Dole is doing best among the kinds of Republicans most likely to
participate in the primaries and caucuses. Of course, Bush might shift
gears and try to become the anti-establishment candidate, which is a
startling concept indeed. That is the difference between Bush and Dole.
Whenever Bush tries to be something he is not--macho, for instance--he
looks foolish. Dole, however, has transformed himself so many times that
he's almost the Zelig of American politics. Ambiguity is Dole's specialty.
Or, as he puts it, "I am a broad-based candidate." He managed the renewal
of the Voting Rights Act and supported the Martin Luther King, Jr.,
holiday, but he also managed the Manion nomination. He voted to support
sanctions against South Africa but then voted to uphold Reagan's veto of
the same measure. He says he is "not a unionbasher" and is considered
accessible by organized labor, but he has also backed right-to-work
legislation.
He is committed to cutting the budget, but his principal theme this year
has been that the Republican Party must "reassert that we are a sensitive,
compassionate, caring party." How? By spending money, of course. In March
he called for the federal government to take aggressive action to prevent
the spread of AIDS, saying, "Whether it takes a hundred million dollars or
a billion or two billion we need to address it." Dole says things that are
surprising coming from a Main Street Republican: he has warned, "We'll
continue to lose Senate seats until we've matured enough as a party. to
bring blacks into the party. "
Dole has been criticized for having a "vision gap." He offers no grand
vision of where he wants to lead the country. Donald Devine, one of his
top advisers, says defensively, "Ronald Reagan has set the basic issue
agenda of the Republican Party, just as Roosevelt did for the
Democrats....You don't need a visionary leader in the White House every
time." The closest Dole comes to a theme is to portray himself as the
candidate of the American heartland, the distressed farmers and
businessmen and Rust Belt industrial workers. "That's where the problems
are," he told Newsweek. "Whenever we get in trouble in this country, we
turn to somebody from the Midwest."
Dole is not exactly Abraham Lincoln, however. He has always had trouble
making emotional contact with voters. There is something terribly cool and
calculating about him. He is at heart a legislative tactician. "I've
always found that it's great to make speeches about what you are going to
do when you take over," he said in a television interview, "but you've got
to have the votes." When asked by The Washington Post to describe how he
was different from the other candidates, he said, "I'm a producer."
Dole is looked on with trepidation by Democrats, but they forget that he
has twice run for national office and twice been a disaster. His skill as
a campaigner remains unproved. He has the reputation of a loner, someone
who likes to call the shots. He has no brain trust and no long-term cadre
of strategists and political confidants. Indeed, his campaign got off to a
rocky start this year when his advisers starting feuding over vision and
strategy. Noting Dole's jump in the polls, a rival strategist pointed out
that Dole's "candidacy is still way ahead of his organization."
Party ideologues try to insist that Dole define what side he is on. For
instance, the columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote last
December that Dole must decide what kind of candidate he will
be--"essentially tactical and oriented to the news media; or determined to
convince the Republican rank-and-file that he is the legitimate heir of
Ronald Reagan." Dole's reply seems to be, Why do I have to choose?
There is an old Eastern European Jewish story about a rabbi renowned for
his brilliance and learning. One day he agreed to settle a dispute between
two business partners. The rabbi asked his wife to bring the first
businessman before him. He listened attentively to the man's case and gave
his considered judgment: "You, sir, are in the right." Then he asked his
wife to bring the other partner into his chambers. Having heard the other
man's side, the rabbi said, "You, sir, are in the right." The two men left
the rabbi's court, satisfied with his ruling and marveling at his wisdom.
The rabbi's wife was astonished. "What kind of judgment is that?" she said
to her husband. "You told the first man he was in the right, and you told
the second man he was in the right. They can't both be in the right." The
rabbi replied, "You, my dear, are also in the right."
It's a brilliant strategy--if you can make it work. So far, Bob Dole's
skills as a tightrope walker have been dazzling. He exploits the two
greatest Reagan weaknesses--Iranscam and the deficit--but somehow manages
not to come across as a critic of the President. He is a hard-core
partisan who chides his party to open itself up to new groups and values.
He is a budget-cutter who talks about spending whatever is necessary on
legitimate social needs. His rhetoric is that of a moderate--pragmatism and problemsolving--but he has a strongly conservative voting
record and has demonstrated a commitment to the conservative agenda.
Bob Dole sells himself, without embarrassment, as an establishment
politician. "We've had Carter the outsider, Reagan the outsider," he said
in an interview. "I think, at least I hope, that those of us who've
demonstrated a little experience...may have a little edge." He and his
wife, Elizabeth Hanford Dole, Reagan's Secretary of Transportation since
1983, are known as Washington's "power couple." At the same time, he
offers himself to the Reaganites as someone who can deal for them. In
response to the criticism that his heart is not with them, Dole says, "I
think what they want is a cheerleader. It's not enough to be with them on
the issues." The polls show that Dole appeals to two disparate groups of
voters: the Republican Party establishment, who admire his cautious and
pragmatic conservatism, and Democrats and independents, who admire his
independence from the Reagan Administration.
How does he do it? Partly through agility, which any tightrope walker
needs. But there is another quality to Bob Dole, one that is well known to
his colleagues in Washington: he is relentless. Remember that he fell off
the tightrope twice, once in 1976 and again in 1980. "I'm a survivor," he
told The Washington Post. "I keep coming back." In what undoubtedly
strains the bounds of journalistic license, the Post interviewed Dole's
ex-wife. Dole appears to have survived that fall, too, since she told the
interviewer, "I think he's the best man to be President. He doesn't know
how to do a job halfway." Dole's relentlessness came out in a famous
exchange on the Senate floor last year, when he said to Robert Byrd, then
the Senate minority leader, "I didn't become majority leader to lose." He
is not running for President to lose either.
If princes of the Senate have problems running for President, princes of
the Cabinet have it even worse. In the American system executive officers
have no political base, either in the party or in the electorate. They are
total insiders. They have a constituency of one: the President. Former
Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Jr., doesn't even have that. He had a
stormy tenure in the Reagan Cabinet and departed under a cloud. When Haig,
a four-star general, announced in March that he was "throwing my helmet
into the ring," his announcement was greeted with skepticism by party
professionals. Haig has cleared the hurdle of name recognition, but it
doesn't help his candidacy. Three out of four voters who had heard of him
at the time of his announcement said they didn't like him. That is most
likely a residue of the day Reagan was shot, when Haig presumptuously
announced, "I am in control here."
Why is Haig running? Probably because he is sixty-two years old, he misses
the limelight, he is not impressed by the stature of the other candidates,
and he wants to vindicate himself. Who is supporting him? A few obscure
figures from the military-industrial complex. (The man who chaired Haig's announcement dinner, the
chief executive officer of Allied-Signal, Inc., let it be known afterward
that he did so as a personal favor and did not intend to get involved in
the campaign. ) Also, the comedian Mort Sahl, who may or may not see the
Haig campaign as a put-on. Another Cabinet official, the former Secretary
of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, dropped out of the race in April. He said
his "background and breadth of experience" made him the best-qualified
person to run the country after Reagan, but that as a "long-shot"
candidate, he would have "a good deal of ground to make up against the
current front-runners." The bottom line for Haig may be the same. Haig,
like Rumsfeld, is really a figure from the Nixon-Ford era--which, to
Republicans these days, means prehistoric.
THE RED GUARD
If the Republican party decides it wants vision in 1988, it need look no
further than Jack Kemp. Kemp is in the vision business. When I interviewed
him earlier this year, he observed that the Iran crisis had created a
vision gap within the Republican Party. "Reagan's State of the Union
Address," Kemp said, "didn't grab anybody forcefully. It didn't set forth
any broad new vision." What about 1988? "I think it's going to come down
to Bush, Dole, and Kemp," he said. "whoever can best articulate a vision
of the future for the party and the country and the Western world is, in
my view, going to win." Kemp, a former Buffalo Bills football star, offers
a vision that is resolutely positive. Every time he gets up to speak, a
band should break out with "You've got toAccent-tchu-ate the
positive, Eliminate the negative, Latch on to the affirmative, Don't mess
with Mister In-between."
Jack Kemp, a nine-term congressman from Buffalo, New York, does not mess
with Mister In-between. He is tirelessly optimistic, tirelessly
enthusiastic, tirelessly committed, and just plain tireless. In 1985-1986
he delivered no fewer than 512 speeches. Like the late Senator Hubert
Humphrey, to whom he has been compared in terms of style--not views--Kemp
never lets up. He has a message and he wants to proselytize the whole
world. The message is, Free the economy and let growth be our salvation.
How does he intend for this to come about? He will tell you, in great
detail and at considerable length. (The joke he tells on himself is that
if someone asks him what time it is, he will explain how a clock works.)
It is the basic supply-side nostrum: low taxes, hard money, low taxes, low interest rates, low
taxes, deregulation, low taxes, free trade, and low taxes. His audiences
sometimes tune out on phrases like "commodity-price deflation," but they
generally get caught up in his sincerity and enthusiasm.
What Kemp has to figure out is how to be tireless without being tiresome.
To that end, his handlers have tried to put him on a verbal diet. "He's
got to decide the three or four things he wants to talk about," one of his
advisers said, "not the fifteen or twenty." It won't be easy. Here is a
classic Kemp sentence, from a speech given to a Republican audience in
Toledo: "It is absolutely essential to our hopes for peace, stability,
democracy, and better foreign policy to have a world that is growing and
expanding with a tide that is rising, upon which all boats can rise, as
opposed to this zero-sum, fiercely divisive Darwinian struggle in which
nations are locked into mercantilistic practices and protectionist
policies that drive people apart, as opposed to bringing people together
in a liberal democratic fashion as I think America was founded upon two
hundred years ago." He added, somewhat superfluously, "That is an overview
not only of the United States but of the world."
In that Toledo speech Kemp harped on the virtues of "liberal democratic
capitalism" so incessantly that a Republican grandee sitting next to me
started to get agitated. "What's all this 'liberal democratic' stuff?" the
man asked. "Is he talking about McGovern?" After the speech, I reported
the problem to the speaker "But I told them 'liberal democratic--small l,
small d,"' Kemp protested. "Congressman," I said, "you know what you mean
and I know what you mean. But I'm not sure these guys know what you
mean."
What is attractive about Kemp's vision is its expansiveness. "The real
issue in this country, particularly for my own party, is how do we take
this 'new beginning' of non-inflationary economic expansion and broaden
it, deepen it, expand it, and advance it into the inner cities, to bring
along those people who heretofore have not had the benefits of what the
recovery has brought?" Kemp is genuinely excited to have "a political
paradigm that the conservative, free-enterprise, democratic capitalistic
politician can use to compete effectively with the redistribute-the-wealth
liberal." Kemp's rhetoric of growth, optimism, and boundless opportunity
provides a future orientation to a Republican campaign that might
otherwise become obsessed with preserving the past. He says his great
advantage over Bush is that he can develop his own theme and message, and
he can tell people what he will do. "Bush is tied to a negative posture on
the economy," Kemp told me last year, "and I want to keep him there--cut
the deficit, maybe raise taxes, pain and suffering, the Eisenhower model.
I'm going to keep talking about growth, about opportunity like Jack
Kennedy: 'We can do better.'"
Kemp also talks about "broadening the base of the Republican Party" by
bringing in new groups who are attracted by its message of growth and
opportunity--the minority communities, the inner cities, blue-collar
working people, young people, union members. He does more than talk about
this. In Congress, Kemp has been a strong supporter of civil rights and of
economic programs for the inner cities. He votes for aid to Africa and
sanctions against South Africa, and is one of the few Republicans liked
and trusted by the Congressional Black Caucus. Not all of this, of course,
sits well with his fellow conservatives--or with Republican audiences
generally, who wonder just why their party needs those kinds of people.
There is a lot of Ronald Reagan in Jack Kemp, particularly in his ability
to reach out to Democrats and nontraditional Republican voters. Kemp has
some of Reagan's populist and anti-establishment appeal. "Jack Kemp
appeals to little people," says Ed Rollins, a former White House political
director and a current Kemp strategist. "He appeals to an
anti-establishment group out there, and Baker and Dole and all the rest
are perceived as being part of the establishment." The populism is
explicit in Kemp's characterization of what the Reagan revolution was all
about: "simply reducing the impediments that stand in the way of men and
women who want to be productive." Those impediments, of course, are high
taxes and big government.
Kemp has on occasion been critical of the Administration on matters of
conservative principle. He is the spiritual leader of the young-turk
conservatives in the House of Representatives, who pressure the party
leadership to be more militant and confrontational with the Democratic
majority. In 1982 many of them stuck with Kemp when he balked at
supporting the Administration's tax-increase bill. Just before President
Reagan went to Iceland, Kemp delivered a speech warning the President not
to fall for "the allure of detente" or cut a deal with Gorbachev on the
Strategic Defense Initiative. He also attacked the Administration's
evident decision to release "a high-level Soviet spy" in exchange for
Nicholas Daniloff, "an innocent American journalist."
Kemp promotes what he calls a "positive" foreign policy that goes beyond
traditional anti-communism to offer a model of economic development and
international security--a supply-side analogue in the international arena.
He told me, "The Soviet Union represents a threat in terms of might. It is
a joke in terms of its economy and what it has to offer the Third World--a
laughingstock to countries that are looking for an economic-development
model."
Kemp also takes a positive view of the SDI, saying that we should try to
convince our allies and friends "and ultimately the Soviet Union that they
have far more to gain by moving to a defensive posture as opposed to the
continual buildup of a heavy, land-based strategic nuclear capability that
they have been relentlessly investing in for the past fifteen years."
Above all, Kemp says, "we should not use the Strategic Defense Initiative
as a bargaining chip."
As for social issues, Kemp is a strong proponent of "traditional values"
and takes the right-to-life position on abortion. However, he has never
pushed the social-issue agenda very hard, claiming that he doesn't want the Republican Party
to be illiberal or intolerant. Kemp's argument is that traditional moral
values can compete in the "marketplace of ideas" if they are debated
fully, openly, and fairly. "Illiberalism is fostered by people who don't
want to debate those issues, he says. Kemp professes to be "comfortable"
with his positions on social issues but "uncomfortable" with the emotion
that others bring to those issues. He told The Washington Post last year,
"People say, 'Well, maybe you're not tough enough.' But I don't think it
has anything to do with macho politics. I think I've advanced my views
with compassion and tolerance."
Taxes are the core of Kemp's philosophy. True to the supply-side faith,
his argument is, The lower the better. Kemp co-sponsored the 1981 tax cut
that to Reaganites constitutes the essence of the Reagan revolution. (To
traditional conservatives it constitutes grievous fiscal
irresponsibility.) He was also a strong supporter of tax reform, and he
helped to engineer the agreement that saved the issue after it was
initially rejected by the House of Representatives, in December of 1985.
His view is that the law as enacted did not go far enough in flattening
tax rates. Once you get beyond the working poor, Kemp favors an
essentially flat tax.
Kemp's "counterintuitive" solution to the deficit is "a demonstrably
easier tax policy, to get greater output from the labor and capital
sectors of the economy." Kemp's national industrial strategy consists of
lowering taxes on business in order to stimulate capital formation. His
idea for enterprise zones in the inner city is based on "abolishing the
number-one tax on the entrepreneur, the-capital-gains tax." Kemp opposes
an oil-import fee to help the energy states: "An oil-import fee is a tax."
He thinks that the Social Security system has been "overfunded" and that
"we ought to think about lowering the payroll tax" as a way of combating
unemployment. When I asked about Mexico's debt problem, Kemp said that the
Mexican government should induce capital to come into the country. How?
"You drop the tax on capital." As for the other countries of Central
America, he said, "All of them are overtaxed." Give the man a hammer and
the world becomes a nail.
Kemp doesn't even like to talk about spending cuts. When I raised the
issue with him, he said, "I just place the highest priority on economic
growth. While all the other members of the House talk about cutting
spending, there ought to be at least one who is concentrating on growth."
In an even greater act of heresy for a Republican, Kemp told me, "I am not
antigovernment. I would not run a campaign against government." He
explained that whereas government has an obligation to promote
opportunity--mostly by lowering taxes and getting out of people's way-
"security is another aspect." He said, "People want opportunity so they
can earn security." Kemp sees himself as a "use-government-where-you-can
conservative" rather than a "fight-government-at-all-costs
conservative."
Consistent with this philosophy, Kemp was one of the few Republicans to
oppose the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings "automatic" deficit-reduction bill. When
Congress failed to meet the deficit-reduction target for 1987, Kemp said,
"We ought to declare victory. I don't think we should tear apart SDI or
inner-city social programs to reach a magic number that's supposed to be
nirvana."
An interview with Pete du Pont, who was the first candidate to declare for
President, suggests that Kemp is not idiosyncratic. He is a Type. Du Pont,
a former member of Congress and governor of Delaware, is another
supply-sider who wants to extend and radicalize the Reagan revolution.
That comes as a surprise to many people who expect someone from Delaware
named du Pont, who was educated at Exeter, Princeton, and Harvard, and who
looks like Nelson Rockefeller, to be the quintessential
eastern-establishment Republican.
He was, for a while. That was when du Pont served in Congress, for three
terms, and compiled a conventionally moderate voting record. Then he was
elected governor, in 1976, and began what he describes as a personal
transformation. "I'm a supply-sider," he told me when we talked at my office in Washington. "I saw it
work at home, in Delaware. The principle of lower tax rates, inducing
people to go out and work and produce, I think is right." When du Pont
took charge, Delaware had a huge budget deficit, above-average
unemployment, a deteriorating economy, the nation's highest
personal-income-tax rate, and one of the lowest state-bond ratings in the
country. The du Pont revolution, which began four years before the Reagan
revolution, imposed spending controls and lowered taxes three times, for a
total tax reduction of 42 percent. The result was a booming economy, an
unbroken series of budget surpluses, and one of the highest state-bond
ratings in the country.
Now du Pont talks about "empowerment." "We used to have a Republican Party
that was a party of accountants," he said, "and that's when we could only
hold the majority in boardrooms and country clubs. The challenge
post-Ronald Reagan is to extend this idea of empowering people to make
decisions in their own lives, to extend it into areas that aren't directly
economic, into what I call the opportunity issues." He acknowledged that
some people say, "Jeez, you know, du Pont was never like that when he was
in Congress." "Well, no, he wasn't," du Pont went on, "because he hadn't
yet gone out and had to lead a government and make it work and seen that
when you empower people, good things begin to happen."
Du Pont even talks about empowerment as a principle of foreign policy.
When I asked about the Reagan doctrine, he said, "It's the same
empowerment question. The Reagan doctrine is, 'We're going to help, but
you've got to do it yourself. We will give you some armaments and we'll
help train you, but we're not going to send troops. '" To the Reagan
doctrine du Pont added the Hungarian corollary: "There are some places you
just can't help." He said, "That was the problem in Vietnam."
Du Pont generally supports the social-issue agenda of the religious right
and welcomes Pat Robertson into the tent, "because that will help make us
into a majority." He added, "When you go talk to a religious
fundamentalist about training opportunities, schools, jobs, inflation, or
taxes, they don't think any differently than anybody else." One of the few
issues on which du Pont deviates from the standard New Right agenda is
abortion. He favors a reversal of Roe v. Wade by the Supreme Court, but
feels that the issue should then be left to the states. He does not
support a constitutional ban on abortions, because "it's not a U.S.
constitutional question." He was booed at a meeting of religious
conservatives earlier this year when he said he felt that AIDS was a
medical, not a moral, problem. Another deviation is South Africa. Like
Kemp, du Pont supports U.S. sanctions against the apartheid regime.
Supply-siders love schemes. Du Pont's schemes include a plan for school
reform, a plan for phasing out farm price supports, "an enormously
complicated Medicare voucher proposal," mandatory work programs for
welfare recipients, an end to the "government monopoly" in education, a
private alternative to Social Security, and, most controversial of all, a
mandatory drug-testing program for all teenagers as a condition for
obtaining a driver's license.
Du Pont combines Bush's background and Kemp's philosophy. He has one
advantage over both of his better-known competitors, however. That is his
experience as governor. He made it work. As a candidate, du Pont is
desperate for publicity. He declared early so that, at least for a few
months, he would have the field all to himself. His candidacy is not a
joke, although it has been called that. Still, there are some humorous
aspects. Can a candidate named Pierre Samuel du Pont IV really aspire to
present himself as a populist? And what about the droll notion that only a
du Pont could present himself as Reagan's true heir, the authentic Teflon
candidate?
The principle source of contention between traditional conservatives like
Dole and Baker and supply-siders like Kemp and du Pont is, of course, the
deficit. The differences are likely to intensify as the campaign for the
nomination proceeds. The purest statement of traditional Republican
thinking on this issue came from the party's leading Main Street
Republican, former President Gerald Ford. President Ford described the
annual deficits as "time bombs." His solution: "Get everyone to share the
pain." Talk about sharing the pain drives supply-siders crazy. It's
austerity talk, "root-canal politics," the kind of thing that made the
Republicans a minority party for fifty years.
The supply-side formula for talking about deficits includes the following
components: How you balance the budget is more important than whether you
balance it ("To balance the budget you have to balance the
economy"--Kemp). Growth is more important than balancing the budget ("It
is impossible for a conservative Republican to even think about balancing
the budget short of a demonstrably growing economy"--Kemp; "The spending
side of the equation is not as important as empowering people"--du Pont).
The Reagan tax cut did not cause the deficit ("The deficit is not due to
the tax cut"--Kemp). The deficit is not especially large, given the size
of the economy ("There is plenty of room for a deficit in this
economy"--Kemp). Deficits serve a purpose ("A nation has to be able to run
deficits to get through bad times the same way we expect families to
borrow when the breadwinner is out of work"--the supply-side guru Jude
Wanniski). Never, never raise taxes ("There are four things you can do
about the deficit. We're doing the third worst one--that's ignore it. The
worst thing is to inflate the economy, because that's a tax on everybody.
The second worst thing you can do is increase taxes"--du Pont).
Can Kemp or du Pont win the nomination on the basis of this kind of
thinking? Kemp, the likelier of the two to do it, has been ridiculed as
Dr. Feelgood, the purveyor of cheap, painless, and ultimately ineffective
economic nostrums. There is something in his thinking that recalls the
cranks of yesteryear--Coin Harvey's Financial School, or Henry George's
single taxers. Perhaps a more serious strike against Kemp is the fact that
he makes traditional Republicans uneasy. He violates too many party
orthodoxies on budgeting and spending. And he wants to bring a lot of
people with "unreliable views" into the party fold.
All of which is to say that Kemp is an outsider and an anti-establishment
candidate. That is exactly the kind of candidate who has tended to catch
fire in recent years--McGovern in 1972, Reagan and Carter in 1976, Hart in 1984. Kemp has the
advantage over his competitors that he alone is offering a coherent
message and a vision of the future--an aggressive rather than a defensive
conservatism. If anti-Bush sentiment continues to accumulate, as
anti-Mondale sentiment did among Democrats in 1984, Kemp is as well
positioned as anyone to take advantage of it.
Kemp rejects the Bush-Mondale analogy. He points out that to Republicans,
even after the Iran scandal, "Reagan isn't a failure. Bush is still the
beneficiary of a great deal of good will toward this President. He served
this President very well." He adds, "I hear a lot of people say, 'Why
doesn't Bush deserve it? Jerry Ford deserved it in 1976." And, to complete
the thought, Jerry Ford lost the election. As for Dole, Kemp calls him
"our most visible and able legislative tactician." What Dole's rise in the
polls demonstrates, he says, is that "it isn't wrapped up. It's nowhere
near wrapped up. It's as wide open as it possibly could be."
Kemp's problem is that although Dole has been steadily moving up on Bush
in the polls this year, Kemp's movement in the polls has been no more than
glacial. (Du Pont has rarely gotten more than two percent. ) It was
especially embarrassing when Alexander Haig declared his candidacy in
March and immediately jumped ahead of Kemp in the polls. Kemp seems
unconcerned. He says, "Polling right now is a momentary existential window
that really doesn't tell you a whole lot about where the passion and
commitment is, and what people may be thinking tomorrow when they get new
information from last night's television news." After all, back in 1983
Gary Hart was seen as a non-starter in the Democratic race. As Hart can
testify from his experience that year, the race isn't over until it
starts.
Kemp has another problem, however. He is under the gun. When Pat Buchanan
announced his decision not to run for President, in January, he posed it
as a challenge to Kemp. He told U.S. News & World Report, "I endorsed
Kemp's right to prove he's got the stuff to lead the movement. That's all
I'm endorsing." Kemp accepted the challenge. He promised, "There won't be
anybody to my right on SDI, on aiding the freedom fighters, on being
anti-communist, on free enterprise and family values." Indeed, Kemp has
become much more combative in recent months. He went before the
Conservative Political Action Conference and accused Secretary of State
George Shultz of purging Reagan supporters from the State Department,
dragging his feet on the deployment of SDI, and undermining the Reagan
doctrine. "In my view," Kemp told the meeting, "it is time for George
Shultz to resign." That got him a standing ovation. On another occasion
Kemp scolded the House minority leader, Robert Michel, for asking the
Administration to delay further aid requests for the contras. When he
addressed a conference of his House Republican colleagues in March, Kemp
called for "constitutional protections for the unborn" and a mandatory
AIDS test for couples applying for a marriage license.
"We're getting closer to uniting the conservative movement," Charles
Black, a Kemp strategist, has said. Maybe. But there is a big hurdle, and
it is not simply name recognition. It is that Kemp's optimism and
confidence do not match the mood of most conservatives these days. Since
the 1986 midterm and the Iran scandal, the right has retreated into a mood
of bitterness and resentment. Conservatives feel betrayed by the
Republican establishment, by the press, and by the Reagan Administration.
They are looking for a leader to express their anger and their desire for
recrimination. What do Jack Kemp and Pete du Pont offer? Buoyancy. That's
where their conservatism differs from Pat Buchanan's. Buchanan has been
called many things, but no one has ever described him as buoyant.
Last year Kemp was asked by reporters how he felt about the prospective
Republican candidacy of the evangelist Pat Robertson. He replied,
"Robertson is broadening the base of the Republican Party, and that's
good....He is as welcome to our party as Jesse Jackson is to the
Democratic Party." The reporters laughed, and Kemp quickly added that his
comment was not intended to "reflect disdain." There are, in fact, certain
similarities between the two Baptist preachers. Both of them enlarge the
political universe. They bring moral energy and vitality to American
politics. They show that there are causes and resentments that lie beyond
the boundaries of a carefully managed national consensus. Attention must
be paid.
There is a lot of slack in the American political system. Barely more than
half of the voting-age population turns out to vote in a typical
presidential election, and that is as high as turnout gets. Robertson and
Jackson appeal to people who do not ordinarily get involved in politics.
Probably most of those who voted for Jesse Jackson in the 1984 Democratic
primaries would not have voted at all if Jackson had not been a candidate.
Something similar may happen if Robertson decides to run in 1988.
Jackson's core constituency, blacks, made up 10 percent of the voters in
1984. They voted 90 percent for Walter Mondale. Robertson's potential
constituency, white born-again Christians, is slightly larger--15 percent
of presidential voters in 1984. They showed the strongest swing to Reagan
of any group in the electorate, from 63 percent Republican in 1980 (when
Jimmy Carter retained some residual appeal to born-agains) to 80 percent
in 1984. In 1984 a fifth of the Democratic primary voters were black. In
1988 white born-again Christians will probably make up about that
proportion of Republican primary voters. In short, what we have here are
two recently politicized minorities, roughly equal in size, moving in
opposite directions, each disproportionately concentrated in one party.
Pete du Pont rejects the parallelism between Jackson and Robertson. He
feels that Jackson was not so much a black candidate as an ideological
candidate of the left. "He's the liberals' liberal," du Pont observes,
"and that's where all their hearts are. I don't think religion is to the
Republican Party what left-wing liberalism, Jesse Jackson, is to the
Democratic Party." That characterization portrays Robertson as just a
preacher, someone on the outskirts of party politics. In fact the evidence
suggests that he, too, has a larger political agenda. As one Republican
political consultant puts it, "Pat Robertson is a politician whose
profession happens to be religion."
When I interviewed Robertson, I asked him what he felt remained on the
agenda of the Reagan revolution. He answered the way you'd expect a
Republican politician to answer. Two things, he said. The trade imbalance
and the federal budget deficit. He didn't mention religion.
Robertson is no redneck preacher. His father was a U.S. senator from
Virginia. He is a graduate of Yale Law School. He founded the Christian
Broadcasting Network and built it into an operation with revenues of
almost $200 million a year, approximately 28 million viewers, and an
affiliated university. Like Jesse Jackson, he projects a serious and
sophisticated public image. In our conversation he addressed the issues
like a businessman, which is what he is, among other things. He said that
if something isn't done about the trade deficit, "we will have credits
against us in excess of a trillion dollars." He foresaw "an erosion of
confidence in the dollar to such an extent that we may find ourselves in
the status of one of the banana republics." He felt that business,
government, and labor should form a partnership to modernize the country's
industrial infrastructure. "It's impossible to run a business on quarterly
results," he said. "There has to be a long-term horizon. As long as we
penalize people on the basis of quarterly returns, we will lose ground to
the Japanese and Germans."
Robertson was equally businesslike on the subject of the federal budget.
He favored cutting $100 billion out of it immediately. "I don't think we
can wait on it," he said. "I think it can be done, and it can be done by
prudent management." He recalled the contention by Peter Grace, the
industrialist who headed a Reagan commission on efficiency in government,
that at least $430 billion in federal spending could be saved over a
three-year period without changing any major programs. Robertson felt that
some agencies should be dismantled, however--"not just improved business
management but whole departments." Among them were the Legal Services
Corporation, Amtrak, Conrail, and the Departments of Education and Energy.
On the issue of tax reform he said that Congress would have to pass "the
Tax Reform Bill of 1987 to give industry back some of the privileges it
took away from them in the Tax Reform Bill of 1986." He favored bringing
back accelerated depreciation schedules, because "there have to be
incentives for people to put their money into speculative ventures." Cast
thy bread upon the waters? Exactly. He told a New Hampshire audience in
March that the biblical parable of the talents was a "tale of free
enterprise" in which the ancient entrepreneur "rented a caravan of camels,
perhaps from the Hertz of the day," and, through smart commerce, earned
the equivalent of a $5 million return on his investment.
Robertson made the controversial statements last June that "a Supreme
Court ruling is not the law" and that "neither Congress nor the President
has a duty to obey judicial rulings with which they disagree." I said I
wanted to give him a chance to explain what he meant. "Bless you," said
Robertson, who then proceeded to talk like a lawyer, which he is, among
other things. "I'm quoting from Article Six of the Constitution, which
says the supreme law of the land will be, one, the Constitution; two,
treaties duly ratified in accordance with the Constitution; and three, the
laws of Congress duly passed. When I was asked the question 'Are Supreme
Court decisions the supreme law of the land?' I said no, they're not,
because the Constitution specifically names three other things as the
supreme law of the land." As the writer Garrett Epps has pointed out,
Robertson did not necessarily learn this in law school. His father said
almost exactly the same thing in the U.S. Senate on March 3, 1960, in
criticism of the Supreme Court decision mandating school integration.
Ignoring the doctrine of judicial review, Robertson told me, "The Supreme
Court has no power to strike a law down. The Supreme Court has the power
not to enforce the law in the courts. The law stays on the books. Perhaps
it's semantics, but the semantics have turned into reality." He cited a
poll showing that a third of the American people believe that the Supreme
Court passes laws, just like Congress. "Well, it doesn't," Robertson said.
"This is just classical constitutional law. It's hardly anything
radical."
The attack on judicial activism has been a central feature of the New
Right's social agenda ever since the "Impeach Earl Warren" movement of the
1950s. It reveals an important point about the outlook of movement
conservatives. Many Americans see the religious right as the latest
incarnation of zealotry and intolerance. Many people, and not just
liberals, have expressed alarm over efforts by evangelicals to
Christianize the Republican Party and, through the party, the entire
country.
Evangelicals, however, see the liberals as the aggressors. According to
the evangelicals, liberals have done exactly what they accuse the
religious right of trying to do--namely, use the power of the state to
impose their values on others. Beginning with the civil-rights revolution
of the 1960s, Democrats and liberals have come to support a wide variety
of reformist social causes, including women's rights, affirmative action,
quotas, busing, gay rights, unrestricted immigration, legalized abortion,
sex education, the required teaching of evolution, the prohibition of
prayer in public schools, and tolerance of pornography.
Liberals typically defend these measures as enhancements of individual
rights. Conservatives, however, see them as enhancements of state power.
Every item on the religious right's social agenda, including a reversal of
the measures just listed, started out as a liberal initiative. Many
originated in federal court cases, most prominently in Supreme Court
decisions. The courts are the least democratic institution of American
government; therefore, the religious right sees itself as a populist force
protesting government encroachments on private morality and personal
liberty.
Liberals see the religious right as culturally aggressive and themselves
as culturally defensive. To conservatives like Robertson, it is just the
other way around. The liberals are the ones who are trying to win official
status for their "anti-religious" moral and social values, while
conservatives are defending pluralism and tolerance. Ronald Reagan
expressed this view when he addressed a prayer breakfast during the 1984
Republican National Convention. "The frustrating thing," the President
said, "is that those who are attacking religion claim they are doing it in
the name of tolerance, freedom, and open-mindedness. Question: Isn't the
real truth that they are intolerant of religion?"
The problem is that throughout history many of those who have demanded
religious liberty for themselves have denied it to others. Puritan New
England was not exactly the model of a tolerant society. Most Americans do
not see the religious right as trying to liberate religion from the
encroachments of the state; they see evangelicals as a religious minority
trying to win control over the state and impose their values on others.
Why? Because that, very often, is what the religious right says it wants
to do.
Paul Weyrich, a leading political strategist for the Christian right, said
this explicitly in a Washington Post article titled "The Cultural Right's
Hot New Agenda." "Cultural conservatism," he wrote, "rejects the argument
that the free market is the only answer to most problems....Government has
an important role in upholding the society's moral fabric--by its own
example; by its use of the 'bully pulpit' inherent in government; and,
sometimes, by legislation." He endorsed the use of "governmental
sanctions" to restrict a "'free market' of values" in which "limits,
restraints and self-discipline" are made to compete with
"self-gratification, sensual pleasures, and materialism." In other words,
the government must help us be good.
Robertson described himself to me as "passionately in favor of human
freedom" and said that he disliked government intervention in people's
lives. "Having said that," he added, "I think we need to recognize that
whenever you have an organ that is spending a trillion dollars a year,
that has two-point-six or two-point-seven million employees, that is
giving checks to over fifty percent of the American people, that organ is
enormously powerful and it is obviously being used right now to bring
about certain types of behavior." He cited several instances among them,
that through its tax policies the government has been encouraging people
to have fewer children. "We essentially are dying out. We are depopulating
America." On another occasion Robertson said that as a result of liberal
abortion laws, "what we are doing is committing racial suicide." He
complained to me that public-school textbooks have "expunged references to
religious experience, denigrated capitalism, and pushed the educational
agenda toward a socialistic and internationalist model." "That was done
with taxpayers' money," he said, "and it was a value judgment that someone
made." Robertson also argued that our social-welfare laws have sought to
"institutionalize aberrant behavior, whether it is drunkenness, drug
addiction, homosexuality, or whatever. I don't think we should do that."
Government, Robertson said, should encourage the right values instead of
the wrong ones. "Should we uphold the traditional family? I think the
answer is yes. Should we try to limit gross pornography? I think the
answer is yes. Should we do something to curb the invasion of drugs? I
think the answer is yes. Should we pay for babies that are begotten out of
wedlock by fathers who have no desire whatsoever to care for them and who
laugh at the system? I think the answer is no. We should force men to take
care of their own children." He added, "No government is neutral. All law
ultimately represents somebody's values."
Fine--but that means that people have the right to examine Robertson's
values. And that is where he leaves many Americans behind. Robertson has
attacked John Dewey, Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, and Sigmund Freud for
contributing to moral decay in the United States. He has tried to use the
power of prayer to change the course of a hurricane. He has described
husbands as "high priests" of the family unit. He has argued that
"non-Christian people and atheists" are using the Constitution "to destroy
the foundations of our society." He told his New Hampshire audience, in
March, that "if we believe that Jesus is God, then every time He spoke,"
it is "a principle as valid as the law of gravity or the law of
thermodynamics." He attempted to heal an AIDS victim on his 700 Club
television show, saying, "We rebuke this virus and we command your immune
system to function in the name of Jesus." He said last year that
Christians, presumably of his persuasion, "maybe feel more strongly than
others do" about "love of God, love of country, and support for the
traditional family." None of those views or values can be described as
consensual or even majoritarian.
Robertson told me that he believes in the separation of Church and State
in the sense that "we should never have one sect that is preferred by
government above any other" and "there should be no religious test for any
office or public trust." But, like Reagan, he claims that "we are a
religious people" and that therefore government "should favor religion."
He claims that 94 percent of Americans are "theists," people who believe
in God. But we should not give an "absolute veto" over our public life to
the six-percent minority "who don't believe in anything." The atheists and
secular humanists are forcing government to disfavor religion, thus
violating the rights of the majority.
As an example he cited evolution, which "is a direct denial of theistic
belief," he said. "Evolution is a theory. It is a hotly contested theory.
It has never been proved." In his view, the nation is being forced to
adopt this unscientific orthodoxy against the will of the majority. He
expressed a characteristically defensive view: "Why don't you give
children a chance to understand both theories? After all, the Declaration
of Independence says all men were endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights. Just imagine how it would sound, 'All men are endowed
by the primordial slime with certain unalienable rights.' It just doesn't
have the same ring of truth to it." Robertson said in New Hampshire, "When
people ask me if I believe in teaching creationism in schools, I ask them,
'Do you believe in teaching the Constitution?'"
Robertson, like most leaders of the religious right, slips from highly
consensual views about family life and drugs to highly controversial views
about evolution and abortion, which to him apparently have the same
status. For example, after he confirmed his belief in the separation of
Church and State, I asked Robertson whether he thought the United States
was a Christian nation. "It used to be, but it's not anymore," he replied.
"I don't think anybody realistically expects it to become one anytime
soon." He seemed unaware that the concept of the United States as a
Christian nation is in fact highly controversial and could be said to
contradict the notion of the separation of Church and State.
Robertson speaks not for all Christians or religious people or Americans
who believe in God but for an aggressive minority of fundamentalists. His
religious practices--faith healing, speaking in tongues--are certainly not
majoritarian. Nor is the personal relationship he claims with God ("What
is God's will for me in this?" Robertson asked last September, in
announcing his interest in running for President. "Let me assure you I
know God's will for me").
In fact, Robertson's prospective candidacy has evoked a strongly negative
public reaction, even among evangelical Christians. A CBS News-New York
Times poll taken in March found that people who watched evangelical
ministers on television were opposed to Robertson's running for President,
56 to 20 percent. Even those who watched Robertson's own show were closely
split over his candidacy. The Atlanta Journal/Constitution polled voters
in twelve southern states in early March and found Robertson, at nine
percent, running far behind Bush and slightly behind Dole and Kemp among
Republican voters. Robertson did better--16 percent--among Republicans who
said they preferred a born-again candidate for President, but he ran
considerably behind Bush in that group as well. More than two thirds of
southern Republicans, and a majority of those who favored a born-again
candidate, said they would not consider voting for Robertson for
President.
Robertson's campaign manager told The Washington Post that as a result of
the scandal involving Jim Bakker, evangelicals may be wary that if a
preacher runs for President they will receive more unwelcome attention.
Robertson, who was not involved in the scandal, suggested that it might be
"a prelude to an accelerating revival" among evangelical Christians. To
non-evangelicals, however, he dismissed the matter as an aberration,
asking whether the fact that a journalist won a Pulitzer Prize for a
fabricated story meant that all journalists were liars.
Robertson's campaign had quite enough problems even before the Bakker
scandal. His televised fundraiser, held last September to announce his
presidential exploratory committee, raised only enough money to cover
costs. Six months later Robertson had gathered fewer than a third of the
three million signatures he said he would need to enter the race. The
Internal Revenue Service has been investigating whether Robertson's
Christian Broadcasting Network abused its tax-exempt status with its links
to the now defunct Freedom Council, an educational organization designed
to get out the Christian fundamentalist vote.
Robertson's most serious problem may be the lawsuit he himself filed
against the former congressman Paul N. (Pete) McCloskey, Jr., and Andrew
Jacobs, Jr., who is still a congressman. McCloskey and Jacobs have accused
Robertson of using his father's influence to avoid combat duty in the
Korean fear. While Robertson adamantly denies the accusation, the
depositions filed in the case raise questions about Robertson's
description of himself as a "Marine combat officer" in Korea. They also
reveal that Robertson sought the help of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North
in gaining access to military records to support his case, and that he
used a freelance journalist to gather information surreptitiously (the
journalist interviewed McCloskey on videotape without informing him that
he was doing so at Robertson's request). Whatever the legal outcome of the
case, the political impact has been to raise questions about Robertson's
veracity.
AND THEY'RE OFF!
Complaints about the 1988 election are already piling up. George Bush
remains the Republican front-runner, but the conventional wisdom is that
Iranscam has made Bush a walking political corpse. The smart money is now
on Bob Dole, but there are still a great many doubts about the Minority
Leader, who seems to have no base, no issue, and not much of a campaign.
While the Republicans have a wounded front-runner the Democrats have no
frontrunner. Gary Hart's spectacular demise leveled the playing field. Not a
single politician of national stature is running for the Democratic
nomination. Only Jesse Jackson has a national reputation, and that
reputation is mixed. There is no man to beat. Each candidate will be
trying to break out of the pack by grabbing publicity any way he can--by
winning straw votes, staging publicity stunts, buying early television
time, as the former Arizona governor Bruce Babbitt is doing in Iowa, or
latching onto splashy issues, as Representative Richard Gephardt did this
spring with foreign trade.
Hart's withdrawal frees up a pool of contributors and activists, for whom
the other candidates are competing. It also encourages new candidates to
enter the race, or to reconsider their decision not to run. Conservative
Democrats with money and influence will implore the Georgia senator Sam
Nunn and the former Virginia governor Charles Robb to reconsider. Liberals
continue to look for a sign that New York Governor Mario Cuomo may make
himself available. Moderates will be appealing to New Jersey Senator Bill
Bradley and Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton.
They may not be interested. For one thing, the press is now emboldened to
look into the private life of every candidate. Press scrutiny, Gary Hart
said just before his withdrawal, "is clearly one of the reasons many
talented people in this nation opt out of public service." Candidates for
President these days must sacrifice dignity as well as privacy. They have
to spend their time suffering fools gladly and being badgered by arrogant
twenty-year-olds with questionnaires. We have reached the point at which
politicians like Cuomo and Nunn would actually diminish their stature by
running for President. Similarly, on the Republican side several popular
and experienced governors from important states have decided that a run
for the presidency might damage their political careers--second-term
governors George Deukmejian, of California, and Thomas Kean, of New
Jersey, and fourth-term governor James Thompson, of Illinois. "It's not in
the cards for a sitting governor to run for President," Thompson has said.
Indeed, every non-incumbent elected President since Roosevelt, with the
exception of John F. Kennedy, was out of office at the time of his
election.
The Republicans still haven't figured out what comes next. Bush and Laxalt
offer the status quo, which, after Iranscam, is a perilously weak
platform. Dole and Haig are the insider candidates who offer experience
and professionalism but no noticeably new agenda. While professionalism
certainly fills a void in the Reagan record, it has never been a potent
vote-getting theme. Kemp, du Pont, and Robertson are trying to run as
outsiders whose answer to the Reagan revolution is more revolution. But
they make Republicans nervous. Their campaigns do not match either the
defensiveness of the party establishment or the bitterness of movement
conservatives. The right will probably fail to unite behind a single
candidate and instead count on picking up the pieces once the party is
punished and cleansed of its sins. For conservatives, 1988 will lead to
1992 just as surely as 1960 led to 1964 and 1976 to 1980.
The Democrats may finally put the battle between the Old Politics and the
New Politics behind them in 1988. In each of the past five presidential
elections the Democrats have experienced a pitched battle between
establishment and insurgent forces. The establishment won in 1968
(Humphrey) and 1984 (Mondale). The insurgents won in 1972 (McGovern) and
1976 (Carter). The Democrats may have finally learned that it doesn't make
much difference which side wins. Mondale (41 percent) did hardly any
better than McGovern (38 percent), Humphrey (43 percent), or Carter in
1980 (41 percent).
These days the Democratic Party cannot afford to see the political world
as "us" versus "them." There are not enough of "us" and too many of
"them." In order for the Democrats to win in 1988, the issue has to be the
Republicans and the Reagan record. The Democrats need to offer a broadly
acceptable alternative for those voters who want change but not too much
change. The key word is pragmatism. The good news is that all the
prospective Democratic candidates, with the important exception of Jesse
Jackson, have been positioning themselves as pragmatists. All of them are
competing to become the new Gary Hart. The bad news is that the Democrats
still have to do the one thing that always gets the party in trouble:
nominate a ticket. Moreover, a growing belief that the party can't lose in
1988 may encourage its familiar tendency toward self-destruction.
There are two kinds of presidential elections in the United States--those
in which the ideological differences between the candidates are heightened
and those in which the differences are minimized. The easiest way to tell
one kind from the other is to look at voter movements. The larger the
difference between the candidates, the harder it is for voters to switch
back and forth between them. You could have taken a poll every month
during 1964, 1972, and 1984 and the results would have been exactly the
same. The differences were clear, and most voters knew which candidate
they were going to vote for all along.
The 1960, 1968, and 1976 races were down to the wire, however. The results
shifted back and forth on a weekly, almost a daily, basis. That is because
both sides ran centrist campaigns, making it easy for voters to switch
from one to the other. The voters seem to enjoy a horse race: 1960 saw the
highest level of voter turnout in any presidential election since the
early part of this century. But Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., had to explain to
liberals that John Kennedy and Nixon were not Tweedledum and Tweedledee
and that it did indeed make a difference which one of them was elected. In
1968 it was dissident candidates, McCarthy, Robert Kennedy, and Wallace,
not mainstream candidates, Humphrey and Nixon, who evoked the most intense
support. In 1976 the election seemed to hinge on which candidate made
fewer gaffes--Carter's ethnic purity versus Ford's liberation of Poland. When the issue
differences between the candidates seem minimal, the voters have to choose
between them on the basis of something else--something trivial, perhaps,
like charisma. American voters are not inherently ideological or
superficial. They respond to the nature of the candidates and the
campaign.
The likelihood is that 1988 will follow the centrist pattern. The
Republicans will offer defensive conservatism and the Democrats will offer
aggressive pragmatism. As in 1960 and 1976, the mood of the electorate
will not be decidedly for change or decidedly for continuity. The election
will be closely fought and highly competitive, with the lead shifting from
one candidate to the other. Ideologues on the left and the right will be
unhappy with the choices and will bemoan the lack of clarity and
coherence. The press will complain about the trivialization of the
campaign. Pundits will ask whether it really makes any difference which
candidate gets elected. Foreigners will criticize the lack of tone and
rationality in American politics. And the voters, faced with a real
contest, will have a wonderful time.
Copyright © 1987, William Schneider. All rights reserved.
"The Republicans in '88";
The Atlantic Monthly, July, 1987, issue.
Vol. 260, No. 1 (p.58-82).
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